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525 
When Facts Don’t Matter 
Eric Berger∗ 
We are used to thinking that facts shape legal outcomes, but 
sometimes the Supreme Court wants nothing to do with facts. In some 
high-profile constitutional decisions, the Roberts Court has ignored 
important congressional findings, deeming irrelevant facts that 
document the very mischief Congress sought to remedy. Similarly, in 
these same cases the Court exploits the muddy line between facial and 
as-applied challenges to avoid confronting particular facts. The Justices 
in these cases do not question the veracity of seemingly relevant facts. 
Rather, they write their opinions as though these facts don’t matter. 
This Article examines the Court’s penchant for brushing aside 
inconvenient facts. Using three prominent decisions as case studies, it 
argues that a majority of Justices too often rely on novel constitutional 
doctrine to dismiss congressional findings and other facts. This collective 
disdain for facts muddles constitutional law, aggrandizes the judiciary, 
and privileges ideology over evidence. Of course, the relevance of 
particular facts is ultimately a legal question, so the Court clearly 
enjoys the prerogative to determine which findings have constitutional 
salience. That said, the Court still owes Congress and the country a 
more careful explanation when it deems irrelevant the very facts that 
prompted legislative action in the first place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a post-factual world. Prominent political figures, 
including the President of the United States, regularly accuse their 
opponents of peddling lies.1 Conservatives and liberals both 
routinely characterize inconvenient news stories as “fake.”2 Our body 
politic is bitterly divided, and the disagreement isn’t limited just to 
politics and policy. We disagree about facts. 
If any public institution in our society is above such partisan 
epistemology, one would think it would be the judiciary. Trial courts 
follow rules of evidence and discovery procedures, and appellate 
courts have various doctrines guiding their approach to different 
kinds of facts.3 Federal judges, moreover, enjoy life tenure,4 so they 
should not be subject to the same political pressures that lead some 
politicians to reject inconvenient facts. If facts should matter 
anywhere, it is in courts. 
 
 1.  See Julie Hirschfeld David & Glenn Thrush, Calling Comey a Liar, Trump Says He 
Will Testify Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06 
/09/us/politics/trump-comey.html?mcubz=3; Katie Zezima, Clinton Accuses Trump of 
Spreading ‘Racist Birther Lie’, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/26/clinton-accuses-trump-of-spreading-racist-birthe
r-lie/?utm_term=.50d19d6ccf80. 
 2.  See Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake News,’ Trump Moves from Alternative Facts to 
Alternative Language, NPR (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17/
515630467/with-fake-news-trump-moves-from-alternative-facts-to-alternative-language; John 
Siciliano, Climate Skeptics Slam New York Times as ‘Fake News,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 9, 
2017, 6:51 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/climate-skeptics-slam-new-york-
times-as-fake-news/article/2631098. 
 3.  See infra Section II.E. 
 4.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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Except sometimes they don’t. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
our most prestigious and important court, sometimes deems 
irrelevant facts that reasonable observers may consider important or 
even crucial. To be clear, the Justices do not usually opportunistically 
embrace “fake” facts like hack politicians or pundits. But the Justices 
are sometimes remarkably willing to cast seemingly vital facts aside 
when rendering important constitutional decisions. In some 
prominent cases, facts don’t matter. 
To be sure, the decision about which facts “count” in litigation is 
ultimately a legal determination. Courts usually decide the salience 
of particular facts, and legal doctrine sheds light on the facts a party 
must prove to assert a viable legal claim. What is striking, though, is 
the Court’s willingness in constitutional litigation to discard certain 
facts without explaining clearly why those facts are legally irrelevant. 
Even more striking is the Court’s willingness to do this even when 
Congress has relied on these very facts in passing the statute at issue. 
The Court’s penchant for avoiding inconvenient facts does not 
stop there. The Justices also sometimes take advantage of the muddy 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, treating certain 
cases as facial challenges, thus avoiding certain facts that would arise 
under an as-applied analysis. In so doing, the Court is able not only 
to steer around inconvenient facts but also to issue broad holdings. 
The Justices, then, not only decide some cases largely in a factual 
vacuum, but do so in the service of aggressive opinions with far-
reaching consequences. 
This Article focuses on three case studies of these interrelated 
phenomena. Shelby County v. Holder,5 Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,6 and National Federation of Independent 
Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius7 are among the most important 
constitutional decisions of the Roberts Court. In each case, five 
Justices, citing novel or, at best, deeply contested constitutional 
principles, deemed legally irrelevant the very facts that Congress had 
thought necessitated the law at issue. In each case, the Justices 
offered minimal discussion of the facts it ignored. In each case, they 
 
 5.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 6.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 7.  NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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offered minimal institutional analysis to support its decision to 
ignore the legislature’s findings. In each case, they also treated the 
challenge as a broad facial one, though there was good reason to 
approach the dispute as a narrower as-applied challenge. Finally, in 
each case the Justices, by a 5-4 vote, reined in congressional 
authority, indicating that Congress had acted unconstitutionally, at 
least in part. 
Beneath the Court’s decision to cordon off certain facts as 
irrelevant lie deeper intuitions about how the world and 
Constitution do (or should) work. These intuitions, contested 
among the Justices themselves, are not deeply etched in 
constitutional doctrine. Indeed, in Shelby County and NFIB, the 
Justices concocted new doctrinal justifications for ruling out certain 
facts, and in Citizens United, they overruled important precedent to 
do the same. Given the political charge of these cases, it seems 
reasonable to ask whether the Court’s repeated disregard for 
inconvenient facts might serve an ambitious normative agenda. 
This problem is not a new one. As Professor Faigman has 
observed, “interpreting the Constitution is a normative enterprise. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, in ‘finding’ facts, the Court’s vision often 
has been affected by the outcome it sought.”8 To Professor 
Faigman’s observation, we might add that the Court’s preferred 
outcome also guides its views of which facts are constitutionally 
relevant.9 And yet, though the determination that certain facts 
cannot support federal legislation is plainly a legal one, the Court in 
these cases has been strikingly slippery about the legal analysis 
guiding the relevance of facts. 
Given this doctrinal obfuscation, the Court enjoys great 
flexibility to focus on some facts at the exclusion of others. The 
Court has been evasive enough about these inquiries that it is 
difficult to pin down exactly what moves it is making and whether 
those moves carry precedential weight. The common thread is 
 
 8.  David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the 
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 612 (1991). 
 9.  Cf. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 1 (2008) (“The Court’s constitutional pronouncements float above 
the empirical mire, neither being informed by contingent realities nor subject to empirical 
check by those realities.”). 
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that  the Court’s treatment of factual questions in constitutional 
litigation  is often stealthy and conclusory—and still frequently 
outcome  determinative. 
Scholarly attention to the Supreme Court’s use of facts in 
constitutional cases is not new.10 Some great work in recent years has 
called attention to a variety of problems involving constitutional 
facts, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s fact–finding processes in 
constitutional cases;11 the Court’s reliance on amicus briefs and “in-
house” research to make factual determinations;12 the deference due 
to congressional factual findings;13 appellate deference to legislative 
facts more generally;14 and the Court’s reliance on “foundational 
facts” to drive doctrinal shifts.15 This scholarship collectively shines 
important light on the significance of facts in the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decision-making.16 
This Article seeks to complicate the conclusions from these 
important studies by arguing that sometimes facts don’t matter as 
much as we like to think. Building on my earlier work on judicial 
 
 10.  See generally FAIGMAN, supra note 9; Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: 
Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Allison Orr Larsen, 
Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012). 
 11.  See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 9; Gorod, supra note 10. 
 12.  See generally Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 1901 (2016) [hereinafter Larsen, Amicus Machine]; Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with 
Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2014) [hereinafter Larsen, Amicus Facts]; Larsen, supra 
note 10. 
 13.  See generally William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013); Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
1185 (2013); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 
(2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2001); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, 
Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69 (2008); Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as 
Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 2027 (2014). 
 14.  See generally Kenji Yoshino, Appellate Deference in the Age of Facts, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 251 (2016). 
 15.  See generally Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 145. 
 16.  A recent news study also identifies numerous factual errors in recent Supreme 
Court opinions. See Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-
court-errors-are-not-hard-to-find. 
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deference in constitutional cases,17 this Article explores the Court’s 
overlooked propensity to reject the legal relevance of seemingly 
central facts. To be sure, it is often important to examine how courts 
determine facts, as the scholars in these earlier pieces have very ably 
done. But judges, lawyers, and scholars must also recognize that the 
content of facts in litigation don’t matter one whit if the court deems 
them legally irrelevant. 
The Justices, to be sure, likely think that they are doing no more 
than exercising their power of judicial review. But when they do so 
without any regard for the facts Congress relied on when legislating, 
they appear stubbornly determined to consider constitutional 
questions in an intellectual vacuum, divorced from the real-world 
conditions that prompted congressional action in the first place. 
Moreover, the Court’s reliance on new doctrinal developments to 
justify its refusal to consider Congress’s facts aggrandizes the 
judiciary’s own power. Though the Justices sometimes talk 
approvingly of judicial restraint, this doctrinal bait-and-switch 
increases their ability to evade Congress’s facts and steer 
constitutional law in new directions. As a result, the Court looks less 
like an impartial tribunal and more like a political body pretending 
that constitutional questions have much easier and clearer answers 
than they in fact do.18  
Part I of this Article examines three prominent Roberts Court 
constitutional decisions in which the Court rejected the relevance of 
facts seemingly justifying the legislation at issue. It further explains 
how these judicial moves helped the Court steer its opinion toward 
both the outcome it desired and a broad holding facially invalidating 
the statutory provisions at issue. Part II offers some explanations for 
this phenomenon. These explanations are not justifications, but they 
can help us understand the phenomenon from various angles. Part 
 
 17.  See generally Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91 WASH. L. REV. 929 (2016); Eric Berger, 
Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465 
(2013) [hereinafter Berger, Deference Determinations]; Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial 
Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
2029 (2011) [hereinafter Berger, Administrative Law Norms]; Eric Berger, In Search of a 
Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision 
Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 18.  See Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
667 (2015) [hereinafter Berger, Rhetoric]. 
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III examines the implications of the Court’s aggressive treatment of 
legislative facts. The Court’s behavior in these cases poses both 
knotty doctrinal questions and broader institutional questions about 
the Court’s role in our constitutional system. Finally, Part IV 
proposes some modest changes to the Court’s approaches to these 
kinds of questions. These proposals would not radically change the 
Court’s work, but they would encourage more careful discussion of 
facts’ relevance and more even-handed constitutional opinions that 
avoid the temptation to brush aside inconvenient evidence. 
I. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FACTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 
A. Congressional Facts and Constitutional Decision Making 
The Supreme Court in each of the case studies examined here 
ignored congressional facts to help it steer the case toward the 
outcome the majority favored.19 These facts fall into the category of 
“legislative facts”20—that is, general facts about the world that 
usually “transcend individual disputes and would likely recur in 
different cases involving similar subjects.”21 In each case, Congress, 
relying on evidence it had examined, legislated to address what it 
believed to be a serious problem requiring a national solution. In 
each case, the Court deemed Congress’s facts irrelevant and 
concluded that Congress had acted unconstitutionally, at least in 
part. Closer consideration of Congress’s facts might not have 
required a different outcome but certainly would have complicated 
the majority’s opinion.  
 
 
 19. By “congressional facts,” I refer broadly to evidence members of Congress examine 
and rely upon when considering a proposed bill. Oftentimes, these facts document the mischief 
Congress sought to address in the relevant statute. In some instances, Congress formally 
includes these facts as part of a statute. In other instances, Congress relies on reports and other 
congressional fact-gathering efforts to educate itself on the realities of the situation. (While 
these wrinkles arguably should be legally relevant, the Supreme Court in the cases examined 
here brushed aside facts without examining these nuances at all.) 
 20.  By contrast, adjudicative facts deal with the particulars of the case before the court. 
See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942). 
 21.  See David L. Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in HOW LAW KNOWS 
156, 162 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007). 
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1. Shelby County and the social conditions justifying regulation 
Shelby County v. Holder considered the constitutionality of 
section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which provided 
the “coverage formula” defining which jurisdictions are covered by 
section 5 of the Act.22 Under section 5, covered jurisdictions must 
seek preclearance—that is, federal approval—for changes to voting 
procedures.23 Recognizing the longstanding and pernicious history 
of voter discrimination in this country, Congress’s purpose behind 
section 5 was to suspend “all new voting regulations pending review 
by federal authorities to determine whether their use would 
perpetuate voting discrimination.”24 
Congress reauthorized the Act several times, but in both 1982 
and 2006, its reauthorizations did not alter the coverage formula.25 
Consequently, most jurisdictions covered in 1975 were also covered 
in 2013, subject to certain “bail out” provisions.26 When the U.S. 
Attorney General objected to voting changes proposed in the 
covered jurisdiction of Shelby County, Alabama, on the grounds that 
the proposed changes harmed minority voters,27 the county sued, 
challenging the constitutionality of the coverage formula. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Shelby County’s favor, striking 
down section 4 in its entirety.28 Though the constitutionality of 
section 5, the preclearance provision, was not at issue in the case, the 
Court effectively gutted that section by invalidating the coverage 
 
 22.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619–21 (2013). 
 23.  Id. at 2620. 
 24.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316 (1966). 
 25.  See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973 (2012))); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 
Stat. 131 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2016) (transferred 
from 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2012))). 
 26.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(a)); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 211–14 (2007) (discussing the bailout provision). 
 27.  See Joint Appendix at 115a, Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96) (noting that 
city had not met “its burden of showing that the submitted changes have neither a 
discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect”). 
 28.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
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formula. Without a coverage formula, no jurisdiction is subject to 
section 5’s preclearance requirements. 
In striking down section 4, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion emphasized that in reauthorizing the VRA in 2006 without 
updating the coverage formula, Congress imposed extreme burdens 
on states unjustified by current needs.29 As the Court put it, “things 
have changed dramatically” since 1965.30 Whereas African-
Americans  once voted at far lower rates than whites, voter turnout 
and  registration “approach parity” today.31 By 2006, “disparities in 
voter registration and turnout” no longer existed,32 and “African- 
Americans attained political office in record numbers.”33 
Having emphasized that voter discrimination was mostly a thing 
of the past, the Court faulted Congress for failing to amend the 
scope of the section 4 coverage formula, which was “based on 
decades-old data and eradicated practices.”34 Whereas racial disparity 
in voter registration and turnout helped the Court in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach justify the coverage formula and preclearance scheme 
in the mid-1960s,35 such disparity no longer existed.36 Federal 
intrusion into state voting procedures may once have been necessary, 
but according to the Court, it was unfair to perpetuate a coverage 
formula based on decades-old state practices.37 
The Court’s holding hinged largely on its understanding of the 
facts, but it ignored the very facts that had prompted Congress to 
reauthorize the VRA in the first place. For example, Congress had 
amassed 15,000 pages of findings documenting pervasive and 
 
 29.  Id. at 2630–31 (asserting that it was irrational for Congress to reauthorize a 
coverage formula that was based on forty-year-old data, when current statistics reflect “an 
entirely different story”). 
 30.  Id. at 2625. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  A recent news study questioned Chief Justice Roberts’s data suggesting that blacks’ 
voter registration rates in 2004 matched or even outstripped whites’ rates. This study 
contended that the Chief Justice used numbers that counted Hispanics as white, including 
non-citizen Hispanics who could not legally register to vote, thus “inaccurately lowering the 
rate for white registration.” See Gabrielson, supra note 16. 
 33.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628. 
 34.  Id. at 2627. 
 35.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 36.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–28 (discussing South Carolina v. Katzenbach). 
 37.  See id. at 2628 (“There is no longer such disparity.”). 
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troubling ongoing discrimination.38 This record demonstrated that 
voting discrimination was not just a problem of the past. Indeed, the 
statute itself included findings detailing evidence of continued 
discrimination, such as various election practices used to dilute 
minority voting strength.39 
Congress had also relied on numerous pieces of anecdotal 
evidence detailing covered jurisdictions’ measures that would either 
inhibit racial minorities’ ability to vote or dilute their voting power.40 
It also had cited studies indicating that discriminatory purpose 
motivated numerous redistricting plans as recently as the 1990s.41 In 
light of these findings, Congress concluded that while 
“[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used 
in 1965, . . . the effect and results are the same, namely a 
diminishing of the minority community’s ability to fully participate 
in the electoral process and to elect their preferred candidates.”42 
 
 38.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(2) (Supp. III 2016) (Congressional Purpose and 
Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (“[V]estiges of discrimination in voting 
continue to exist as demonstrated by second generation barriers constructed to prevent 
minority voters from fully participating in the electoral process.”); Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 
2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 39.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(4)(a) (Supp. III 2016) (Congressional Purpose 
and Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (citing as evidence of continued 
discrimination “the hundreds of objections interposed, requests for more information 
submitted followed by voting changes withdrawn from consideration by jurisdictions covered 
by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Section 5 [15 U.S.C. 10304] enforcement actions 
undertaken by the Department of Justice in covered jurisdictions since 1982 that prevented 
election practices, such as annexation, at-large voting, and the use of multi-member districts, 
from being enacted to dilute minority voting strength” (alteration in original)). 
 40.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 464–65 (D.D.C. 2011) (listing 
examples from congressional record), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013). 
 41.  See id. at 465 (noting that Congress had considered several studies). 
 42.  H.R. REP. NO. 109–478, at 6 (2006) (quoted in Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(5) (Supp. III 2016) 
(Congressional Purpose and Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (“The 
evidence clearly shows the continued need for Federal oversight in jurisdictions covered by the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 since 1982, as demonstrated in the counties certified by the 
Attorney General for Federal examiner and observer coverage and the tens of thousands of 
Federal observers that have been dispatched to observe elections in covered jurisdictions.”). 
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Interestingly, the majority did not dispute the veracity of 
Congress’s findings.43 Rather, the Court disparaged those facts’ 
relevance and signaled that Congress should have focused on 
different facts.44 “Regardless of how [we] look at the record,” 
it  explained, “no one can fairly say that it shows anything 
approaching  the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ 
discrimination . . . in 1965.”45 Continued voter discrimination, then, 
was irrelevant in the Court’s eyes, because it paled in comparison to 
discrimination of years past. The Court, however, never explained 
why continuing discrimination is legally irrelevant just because it is 
less severe than past discrimination.46 
The majority also did not grapple carefully with Congress’s 
findings that the preclearance provision continued to play an 
important role in reducing voter discrimination.47 To its credit, the 
Court did concede that the VRA deserved substantial credit for the 
decrease in voting discrimination.48 But in so doing, the Court did 
not explain why preclearance did not remain a vital tool to combat 
voter discrimination, especially given evidence indicating that the 
preclearance provision continued to do real work blocking voter 
discrimination. For example, the House report, drawing on 
voluminous evidence, had found that “between 1982 and 2006, 
DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting changes based on a 
 
 43.  But see Ross, supra note 13, at 2062–63 (arguing that the majority in Shelby County 
distrusted Congress’s facts). 
 44.  See id. at 2061 (“[T]he majority selectively emphasized certain record evidence, 
second-guessed other evidence, and simply ignored other evidence.”). 
 45.  Id. at 2062 (quoting Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629). 
 46.  See Ross, supra note 13, at 2062 (“The conservative Justices essentially disposed of 
the remainder of the 15,000 page congressional record supporting the Act in one sentence.”). 
 47.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(1) (Supp. III 2016) (Congressional Purpose and 
Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (“Significant progress has been made in 
eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased 
numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in 
Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 [this chapter and chapters 105 and 107 of this title].” (alteration 
in original)). 
 48.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (“There is no doubt that these improvements are 
in large part because of the Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at 
redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting process.”). 
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determination that the changes were discriminatory.”49 The obvious 
implication was that without preclearance, voter discrimination in 
this country would have been substantially worse than it is. The 
Court, however, brushed aside these facts, arguing simply that 
Congress’s record “played no role in shaping the statutory formula” 
at issue.50 
The Court, to be sure, was correct that the coverage formula had 
been designed decades earlier. The majority, however, did not 
explain why it should not consider evidence before Congress that 
updating the coverage formula would have been ill advised.51 Nor 
did the majority grapple with congressional experts who explained 
that tinkering with the coverage formula might have turned the 
statute “into a farce.”52 Based on the evidence before it, Congress 
concluded that voter discrimination was still a problem serious 
enough to merit preclearance and that, given the practical problems 
inherent in updating, the best option was to preserve the old 
coverage formula.53 The Court did not engage with any of 
these facts. 
 
 49.  See id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 21 
(2006)). Statistics about DOJ objections can hardly be blamed on an overzealous, liberal 
Department of Justice, given that Republicans controlled the White House for sixteen of the 
twenty-four years in question. See also Voting Determination Letters for Alabama, THE UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-
determination-letters-alabama (listing DOJ objections to Alabama voting practices by year). 
 50.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629. 
 51.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting The 
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 99 (2006) (explaining that updating the formula on the basis of turnout and 
registration data from 2000 and 2004 would have ignored the “long, open, and notorious 
history of disenfranchising minority citizens”)), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 52.  152 CONG. REC. H5181 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner) (criticizing proposal in House to change the coverage formula); see also Shelby 
Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (citing voting rights scholars). 
 53.  See Shelby Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (“Congress in 2006 found that voting 
discrimination by covered jurisdictions had continued into the 21st century, and that the 
protections of Section 5 were still needed to safeguard racial and language minority voters.”). 
To be sure, an updated coverage formula was probably theoretically preferable, see id. at 438 
(noting that many voting rights scholars before Congress in theory preferred an “updated 
trigger”), but most scholars also told Congress that they were “skeptical” about plans to 
update the coverage formula, see id. 
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The Court presumably ignored these congressional facts because 
it believed that preclearance imposed unfair burdens on covered 
jurisdictions whose behavior had improved in recent decades.54 But 
given the Court’s concern for the burdens the VRA imposed on 
covered jurisdictions, the Court should have also more carefully 
explained why the statute’s “bail out” provision was inadequate. 
That provision permits covered jurisdictions to relieve themselves of 
preclearance burdens by demonstrating their improved practices.55 
Almost 200 jurisdictions have bailed out of the preclearance 
requirement successfully since the provision took effect in 1984.56 
Though the Court made passing reference to these provisions, it 
failed to confront the argument that the VRA, far from being static, 
is “capable of adjusting to changing conditions.”57 The Court’s blind 
eye to congressional facts and its sympathy to the burdens the statute 
imposed on benevolent state governments, then, is especially strange 
given that the statute provided a mechanism for those very states to 
exempt themselves. 
The Court’s decision to brush aside Congress’s findings is even 
stranger in light of the fact that section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment entrusts Congress with broad power to protect against 
race-based voter discrimination.58 The Court’s treatment of 
Congress’s facts amounted to a legal determination that those facts 
were constitutionally irrelevant, but the Court did not explain why 
that must be so. If anything, one would think that section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment should require the opposite presumption that 
 
 54.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (“[T]he Act imposes current burdens and must 
be justified by current needs.” (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 
U.S. 193, 203 (2009))). 
 55.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 
1973b(a) (2012)). 
 56.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See Jeremy Amar-Dolan, The Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment 
Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1500 (2014) (arguing that because the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s subject matter is narrower, Congress’s power to enforce it is not at risk 
of becoming a plenary power, and therefore courts should give Congress more deference when 
it legislates under that provision); Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights 
Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 381−86 (2014) (arguing that in light of section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, federal preclearance for voting changes is a modest measure Congress 
may take to protect against voter discrimination). 
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Congress has broad leeway to tackle race-based voter discrimination 
and that its factual findings therefore deserve deference.59 The 
Court, however, refused to grapple with these complications, 
preferring instead to brush aside inconvenient evidence.60 
2. Citizens United and the political conditions justifying regulation 
Citizens United v. FEC61 provides another example of the Court’s 
refusal to engage with congressional facts. The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) contained several amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Most relevant 
here, it prohibited corporations and unions from using their general 
treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is 
an “electioneering communication” or that expressly advocates for 
the election or defeat of a candidate.62 
Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, released Hillary: The 
Movie, a documentary attacking Hillary Clinton, who was then 
running for president. Recognizing that it might run afoul of BCRA 
if it ran the movie in the days leading up to the primary election, 
Citizens United sought to enjoin the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) from enforcing these provisions on the grounds that BCRA 
violated the First Amendment.63 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with the plaintiff, holding that restrictions on independent 
expenditures by corporations’ general treasuries for election-related 
speech violated the First Amendment.64 
As in Shelby County, the Court deemed irrelevant facts that had 
motivated the law in the first place. Before passing BCRA, Congress 
had carefully studied the role of money in elections. Specifically, in 
the wake of the 1996 election, the Senate Committee on 
 
 59.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; Michael W. McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 
182 (1997) (noting that the Reconstruction Amendments left the remedy to Congress). 
 60.  Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46−47, Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-
96); Ross, supra note 13, at 2061 (arguing that the majority’s approach to Congress’s findings 
“appears to have been driven by a presumption about political process malfunction”). 
 61.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 62.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 
441b (2012)). 
 63.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–22. 
 64.  The Court upheld BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements. See id. at 372. 
1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2018  2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
540 
Governmental Affairs commenced an extensive investigation into 
campaign practices during that election. The Committee in 1998 
ultimately issued a six-volume report presenting its findings.65 
The report concluded that the nation’s election system was “in 
crisis, with the worst problems stemming not from activities that are 
illegal under current law, but from those that are legal.”66 In 
particular, the report blamed the “soft money loophole” for causing 
“a meltdown of a campaign finance system.”67 The report concluded 
that in 1996 “both parties [had] promised and provided [large 
donors with] special access to [important] candidates and 
[g]overnment officials in exchange for large soft-money 
contributions.”68 Congress paid close attention to the report’s 
conclusions and ended up enacting many of the Committee’s 
proposed reforms when it passed BCRA in 2002.69 
Though McConnell v. FEC had upheld BCRA’s limitations on 
electioneering communications,70 Citizens United reversed course.71 
Of particular relevance here, Citizens United gave virtually no weight 
to Congress’s findings documenting the pernicious role of money in 
our elections.72 The majority pointedly rejected the argument that 
Congress has a “compelling constitutional basis” to guard against 
corruption and the appearance of corruption in local and national 
elections.73 Instead, the Court summarily concluded “that 
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do 
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”74 
In so concluding, the Court entirely ignored the Senate 
Committee report’s findings to the contrary.75 The report, indeed, 
 
 65.  See S. REP. NO. 105-167, vol. 1, at 7−9 (1998). 
 66.  S. REP. NO. 105-167, vol. 4, at 4610. 
 67.  See id. at 4611; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 129 (2003) (summarizing 
Senate Committee report). 
 68.  See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130 (summarizing Senate Committee report). 
 69.  See id. at 132. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 74.  See id. at 357 (majority opinion). 
 75.  Citizen United’s refusal to consider the report’s findings contrasted sharply with 
McConnell, which had not only discussed the report in some detail but noted that Congress 
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had asserted that “large concentrations of wealth . . . hav[e] the 
potential to corrupt the federal election process.”76 For example, the 
report documented numerous allegations of government officials 
taking action during an election cycle “to obtain or reward a 
campaign contribution.”77 Many such actions did not violate the law 
prior to BCRA but nonetheless, as the report emphasized, “create an 
appearance of favoritism or impropriety.”78 The report went so 
far  as  to note that most experts it heard from agreed that 
this  culture  of  buying political access amounted to a “crisis in 
American democracy.”79 
The report did not reflect the thoughts merely of some fringe 
senators. To the contrary, these conclusions reflected the views of 
both the Senate majority and minority.80 Additionally, important 
scholarship and the district court’s findings in McConnell v. FEC 
both reinforced the report’s basic conclusions.81 
 
had enacted many of the report’s proposed reforms in BCRA to address the concerns raised by 
the report’s findings. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129−32. 
 76.  S. REP. NO. 105-167, vol. 5, at 7516 (1998). 
 77.  Id. at 7541. 
 78.  Id. at 7542. 
 79.  Id. at 7516 (quoting former Vice President Walter Mondale and noting that most 
of the expert witnesses from whom the Committee heard agreed with this sentiment). 
 80.  The majority report had focused on Democratic Party fundraising, while the 
minority report had focused on Republican Party fundraising. See generally S. REP. NO. 105-
167; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130. 
 81.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–60, 622–25 (D.D.C.) 
(finding that corporations and labor unions routinely notify members of Congress about their 
electioneering communications relevant to those members’ elections with the not-so-subtle 
objective of currying favor), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in 
part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 
94–95 (2011); Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term – Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012) (“[I]t is just as possible to defend campaign finance 
regulation as an effort to clear the channels of political change by reducing the influence of 
wealth on electoral outcomes.”); Jennifer Mueller, The Unwilling Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
1783, 1789 (2015); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1105−06 (2002) (noting that 
“corporations might be particularly pernicious rent seekers,” and that therefore discrimination 
against corporate political speech might be “an appropriate response to the competitive 
advantages provided by the corporate form in the market for legislation”); Thomas Stratmann, 
What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. 
ECON. J. 606, 615 (1991) (concluding that sugar industry interest groups successfully used 
political contributions to purchase legislative subsidies). 
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Though Congress had compiled this “virtual mountain of 
research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to 
avert,”82 the Court dismissed those findings as irrelevant. The Court 
emphasized that preventing quid pro quo corruption—that is, 
political favors in direct exchange for monetary contributions—was 
the only permissible governmental interest justifying the kinds of 
regulations at issue.83 Because the Court limited the doctrinal inquiry 
to this narrow definition of corruption, the Court could ignore 
Congress’s findings.84 As the Court explained, there were no “direct 
examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.”85 
“Ingratiation and access,” the Court asserted, “are not 
corruption.”86 This narrow definition of “corruption” allowed the 
Justices to turn a blind eye to the very facts that Congress thought 
merited legislation.87 
To its credit, the Court at least acknowledged this doctrinal 
move, tracing it back to the seminal campaign finance decision, 
Buckley v. Valeo.88 Buckley, however, was hardly the Court’s only 
word on the matter.89 Furthermore, merely citing Buckley as the 
source of the unique concern for quid pro quo corruption does not 
adequately justify the Court’s refusal to consider factual evidence of 
corruption (understood more broadly) that Congress thought 
justified the statute. 
 
 82.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 83.  See id. at 359 (majority opinion) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest 
was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 
(2014) (“Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—’quid pro quo’ corruption.”). 
 84.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 85.  See id. at 360 (majority opinion) (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 360). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 295, 298 (2011) (explaining that 
Justice Kennedy seemed to believe that facts did not aid the analysis in Citizens United). 
 88.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (“The Buckley Court explained that the 
potential for quid pro quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from 
independent expenditures.”). 
 89.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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Phrased differently, the majority’s approach enabled it to duck 
the strict scrutiny analysis that examines not only the burden on free 
speech but also the mischief Congress sought to address. How could 
the Court know whether the government has a compelling interest 
in stemming corruption (broadly defined) and the appearance of 
corruption without considering Congress’s evidence that corruption 
exists and causes serious harm to our political system? And how 
could the Court know that BCRA’s efforts to limit such corruption 
were not narrowly tailored enough without examining the statute 
against the problem Congress sought to remedy? The Court’s 
narrow definition of “corruption” may have seemed like a clever 
rhetorical move that determined the outcome of the case. However, 
on closer analysis, this argument merely sidestepped the relevant 
First Amendment inquiry. 
The Court’s ungenerous attitude toward congressional findings 
is especially noteworthy, because BCRA permitted corporations to 
engage in election-related speech through Political Action 
Committees (PACs).90 Congress, in other words, left open PACs as 
an avenue for corporations to engage in the same speech that BCRA 
regulated.91 The Court quickly dismissed the PACs as “burdensome 
alternatives,”92 but it is far from clear why this should be so. As 
Professor Briffault explains, the various rules regulating PACs, such 
as record-keeping requirements, “appear to be pretty basic 
requirements essential to any campaign finance regime for assuring 
the regularity, responsibility, and transparency of campaign finance 
participants.”93 Moreover, the Court pointed to no facts to support 
its conclusion that the PAC requirement was too burdensome.94 
 
 90.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 
441b(b)(2)(C) (2012)). 
 91.  Cf. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003) (“The PAC option allows 
corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political 
influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it 
lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . . 
without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations’ members . . . .”). 
 92.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337−38. 
 93.  Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance 
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 666 (2011). 
 94.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority found the PAC option too burdensome without reference to the record but simply by 
resorting to its “own unsupported factfinding”). 
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To be fair, the majority had significant constitutional arguments 
in its favor. The law did “muffle” some political speech,95 which 
enjoys special status under the First Amendment.96 The Court also 
made the legitimate point that the government’s interest in 
campaign finance regulations is undermined, at least in part, by the 
frequency with which many political contributors circumvent such 
regulations.97 Moreover, strict scrutiny usually protects the right 
holder, so the Court may well have struck down the law even had it 
examined the facts.  
That all said, the Court did not actually apply the strict scrutiny 
test to the facts upon which Congress relied so much as announce 
that the government had failed it. The Court therefore never 
explained why, given Congress’s findings, the challenged policy was 
not narrowly enough tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest, especially given that the law still permitted corporations to 
engage in election-related speech through PACs.98 The Court, in 
short, gave scant hearing to the argument that campaign finance 
regulation is necessary to protect against wealthy individuals and 
corporations controlling the outcome of elections and thereby 
skewing policy to suit their interests.99 
3. NFIB and the object of congressional regulation 
A majority of Justices also deemed important facts legally 
irrelevant in their Commerce Clause analysis in NFIB v. Sebelius.100 
That portion of the case involved a constitutional challenge to the 
individual mandate of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). The ACA aimed to increase the number of 
Americans with health insurance and to decrease the cost of health 
 
 95.  See id. at 336−41, 354 (majority opinion). 
 96.  See id. at 336−41. 
 97.  See id. at 364 (“Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers find 
ways to circumvent campaign finance laws.”). 
 98.  See id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The real issue in this case concerns how, 
not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering.”); Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral Free 
Speech, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1042−49 (2016) (arguing that the Court gave inadequate 
scrutiny to whether corporate contributions from general treasury funds harm eligible voters’ 
abilities to influence the political process). 
 99.  See Karlan, supra note 81, at 30. 
 100.  NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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care.101 To that end, the individual mandate requires most Americans 
to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage.102 The 
challengers asserted, inter alia, that the mandate exceeded 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 
Chief Justice Roberts and, in a separate joint dissent, Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito all agreed that the Commerce 
Clause did not authorize the mandate.103 Though the Court 
ultimately did uphold the constitutionality of the mandate because 
the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan agreed that it was constitutional under Congress’s taxing 
power, the Justices nevertheless addressed the Commerce Clause 
issue at some length.  
The Chief Justice, for his part, concluded that the mandate does 
not “regulate” commerce but instead compels unwilling individuals 
to become active in commerce by buying health insurance.104 
“Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate 
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing,” the Chief 
Justice concluded, “would open a new and potentially vast domain 
to congressional authority.”105 Congress, on this account, was 
regulating inactivity by requiring people to enter a market for health 
insurance they otherwise would avoid.106 
The joint dissent saw the facts similarly. It contended that 
uninsured young persons “are quite simply not participants in [the 
health care] market, and cannot be made so (and thereby subjected 
to regulation) by the simple device of defining participants to include 
all those who will, later in their lifetime, probably purchase the 
goods or services covered by the mandated insurance.”107 
 
 101.  See id. at 2580. 
 102.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580. 
 103.  The joint dissent disagreed with the Chief Justice’s opinion insofar as he upheld the 
individual mandate under Congress’s taxing power. However, like the Chief Justice, the joint 
dissent thought the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s commerce power. Because the 
two opinions’ analyses of the commerce issue were similar, this Part will discuss them together. 
Similarly, this Article will sometimes refer to these five Justices’ views of the Commerce Clause 
issue as the view of the majority (because on this issue, they were). 
 104.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See id. 
 107.  Id. at 2648 (joint dissent). 
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The Chief Justice and joint dissent’s characterization of the 
mandate as unwelcome governmental regulation of the inactive 
turned in part on a conception of time that differed from Congress’s. 
Congress viewed the problem over a period of months or even 
years.108 A person who is healthy today may become gravely ill or 
injured tomorrow. The young and vigorous will eventually become 
old and infirm.109 Almost everybody will eventually need health care, 
and some people will unexpectedly require it in the next year. For 
those reasons, in Congress’s eyes, an individual’s decision not to buy 
health insurance today should constitute action.110 As Dean Minow 
puts it, that decision “becomes a predicate for financial disaster when 
medical bills arrive,” as they almost inevitably will.111 
By contrast, the Chief Justice and the joint dissent saw the same 
decision through a much narrower temporal frame. Individuals who 
don’t want health insurance should be viewed only as of the present 
moment.112 So understood, they cannot be deemed active in the 
health care market (or anything else). These people are “doing 
nothing” right now,113 and it doesn’t matter that some inevitably will 
go to the doctor tomorrow. 
Given their characterizations, the Chief Justice and joint 
dissenters could conclude that the individual mandate compels 
unwilling participation in a market.114 This conclusion was crucial. 
Indeed, the key doctrinal innovation––that Congress cannot use its 
Commerce Clause authority to regulate inactivity––hinged on the 
assertion that the individual mandate forced people into a market 
they otherwise would have avoided.  
 
 108.  See Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and the 
Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 126–27 (2012). 
 109.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 110.  See Minow, supra note 108, at 126–27. 
 111.  See id. at 127. 
 112.  See id. 
 113.  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 114.  See id. The Chief Justice acknowledged that economists might see no distinction 
between activity and inactivity, but he evaded this difficulty by concluding that “the distinction 
between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost” on the Constitution’s 
framers. Id. at 2589. 
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This doctrinal innovation may have been rhetorically clever, but 
it deliberately turned a blind eye to Congress’s findings. More 
specifically, both the Chief Justice and the joint dissent ignored 
evidence demonstrating that many uninsured people are doing 
something. Specifically, many people are consuming health care 
without paying for it, thereby passing their costs on to 
other Americans.115  
Congress, in fact, included in the statute itself findings 
supporting this very proposition.116 For example, Congress found 
that “[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured 
was $43,000,000,000 in 2008” and substantially affected interstate 
commerce.117 It further found that “[t]he economy loses up to 
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter 
lifespan of the uninsured.”118 Congress concluded that the mandate, 
in conjunction with the Act’s other provisions, would significantly 
reduce this economic cost by reducing the number of uninsured 
persons.119 Admittedly, Congress did little of this research itself, 
looking instead to policy briefings and academic studies.120 
Nevertheless, Congress relied on the evidence it studied to deem 
health care reform an urgent legislative priority with broad 
ramifications for the national economy.121 
In addition to this compiled evidence, Congress highlighted the 
reason why the decision not to purchase health insurance should not 
be characterized as “inactivity.” In the provision articulating the 
connection between the national economy and interstate commerce, 
Congress explained: 
The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and 
economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how 
 
 115.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(A) (2012). 
 116.  See generally id. § 18091(1)–(2)(J). 
 117.  Id. § 18091(2)(F); see also id. § 18091(1); Jack Hadley et al., Covering the 
Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 402 (estimating that, in 2008, uninsured people would receive 
$54.3 billion of uncompensated care). 
 118.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E). 
 119.  Id. § 18091(2)(F). 
 120.  See Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative Findings and the Deference Problem, 102 
GEO. L.J. 637, 652–75 (2014). 
 121.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18091. 
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and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is 
purchased. In the absence of the requirement, some individuals 
would make an economic and financial decision to forego health 
insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which increases 
financial risks to households and medical providers.122 
Congress, in other words, found that the great number of 
uninsured individuals burdens the nation’s health care system by 
consuming health care without paying for it.123 Because almost 
everybody enters this market during their lives and because many 
people enter it unwillingly or unexpectedly every year,124 Congress 
was simply trying to ensure that people would pay, through 
insurance, for the services they inevitably consume. Quite simply, 
many uninsured persons get sick, go to the emergency room, can’t 
pay their bills, and thus raise the cost of health care for everyone 
else.125 Consequently, “the decision to forego insurance is hardly . . . 
equivalent to ‘doing nothing,’” but is rather, as Justice Ginsburg put 
it, “an economic decision Congress has the authority to address 
under the Commerce Clause.”126 
As in Shelby County and Citizens United, the majority of Justices 
cast aside these findings as legally irrelevant. However, whereas in 
those cases the Court indicated that Congress had focused on the 
wrong kinds of facts, the NFIB majority signaled that Congress had 
mischaracterized the phenomenon. In the majority’s eyes, an 
 
 122.  Id. § 18091(2)(A). 
 123.  See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 124.  See id. at 2610 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS: NATIONAL HEALTH 
INTERVIEW SURVEY 2009, ser. 10, no. 249, tbl. 37, at 124 (Dec. 2010)). 
 125.  See 155 CONG. REC. H12,853 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee); Arthur Nussbaum, Can Congress Make You Buy Health Insurance? The Affordable Care 
Act, National Health Care Reform, and the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 50 
DUQ. L. REV. 411, 452–53 (2012) (arguing everyone participates in the health care market 
because the uninsured are really just self-insured); Robert F. Rich et al., The Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010: Implementation Challenges in the Context of Federalism, 16 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 77, 96–97 (2013) (discussing whether the individual mandate 
regulates the “insurance” market or the “health care” market). 
 126.  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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individual’s decision to self-insure was inactivity and therefore 
beyond the scope of commerce.  
Accordingly, Congress’s factual findings about the economic 
consequences of free riders in the health care market were legally 
irrelevant.127 As in Shelby County and Citizens United, the Chief 
Justice mostly did not dispute Congress’s facts as an empirical 
matter. He did, however, contend that Congress was relying on mere 
prophesy when it determined that some uninsured people will 
consume health care without paying for it.128 This argument, 
however, ignored Congress’s evidence that many uninsured people 
do go to the hospital each year and fail to pay their bills.129 The Chief 
Justice and joint dissenters, in other words, crafted an analysis that 
treated hard data as hypothetical. 
The Chief Justice and joint dissent’s approach to Congress’s facts 
in NFIB is even stranger, because it is at odds with other cases 
emphasizing the respect owed to legislative choices. Most relevant 
here, in King v. Burwell, a statutory interpretation case about the 
ACA, the Court declared that “[a] fair reading of legislation 
demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan.”130 In stark 
contrast to NFIB’s Commerce Clause discussion, the Court engaged 
seriously with the ACA’s policy objectives to “minimize . . . adverse 
selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include 
healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.”131 
King, thus, admonished that courts should “respect the role of the 
 
 127.  See Crane, supra note 120, at 652–75. 
 128.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The proposition that 
Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today because of prophesied future activity 
finds no support in our precedent.”). 
 129.  The analysis of the Commerce Clause issue was not the only important portion of 
the opinion in which the Justices disagreed about facts. For example, in the sections of the 
opinions addressing the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion under the Spending 
Clause, the Justices disagreed about whether that expansion resulted in two separate Medicaid 
programs or one. Compare id. at 2605–06 (“The Medicaid expansion . . . accomplishes a shift 
in kind, not merely degree.”), with id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Medicaid, as amended by the ACA . . . is a 
single program with a constant aim.”). See also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–29 (2013) (discussing whether the Medicaid expansion was an 
incremental change or a shift in kind). 
 130.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
 131.  Id. at 2493 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)). 
1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2018  2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
550 
Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.”132 Neither 
King nor the constitutional cases examined here explain why the 
Court should afford respect to legislative goals and findings in some 
contexts but not others involving the same statute.133 
Five Justices’ approach to facts in their Commerce Clause 
discussions may seem inconsequential dicta, given that the Court 
decided to uphold the mandate anyway under Congress’s taxing 
power. Nevertheless, the fact that five Justices took the trouble to 
write or join extensive discussions rejecting Congress’s view of what 
it was regulating speaks to the Court’s disregard for congressional 
facts. If anything, the Chief Justice’s willingness to cast aside 
congressional findings here is especially striking because the 
discussion was entirely unnecessary.134 
B. Facts and Facial Challenges 
In addition to ignoring Congress’s facts, the Justices in these 
cases also treated each challenge as a facial one. This move enabled 
the majorities to avoid other inconvenient facts. It also helped them 
write broad opinions that invalidated the relevant provisions in all 
their applications rather than simply as applied to the plaintiffs in 
those cases.135 
The decision to treat a case as a facial or as-applied challenge may 
seem unrelated to its treatment of congressional findings. However, 
upon closer examination, both determinations allow the Justices to 
push aside facts they prefer to avoid. We do not typically think of the 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges as being a 
determination about facts, but whether a challenge is framed as facial 
 
 132.  Id. at 2496. 
 133.  Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 94 
(2012) (arguing that the Chief Justice’s approach to the Commerce Clause in NFIB “reads a 
statute to create constitutional problems”). 
 134.  The joint dissenters shared this view, but their discussion of this issue was necessary, 
because they would have invalidated the individual mandate and therefore needed to explain 
why Congress lacked the power to pass the mandate under the Taxing, Commerce, and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses. 
 135.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. 
L. REV. 915, 917 (2011) (noting the Justices’ “assumption that facial challenges are and ought 
to be rare”). 
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or as-applied has potentially important consequences for the universe 
of relevant facts.  
Though the Court’s approach to the distinction between facial 
and as-applied challenges is inconsistent,136 as-applied challenges 
often implicate narrower, adjudicative facts involving the particular 
party to the litigation.137 By contrast, a facial challenge tends to 
involve broader, legislative facts about the statute writ large. After all, 
the facial challenge calls into question the validity of the statute in all 
its applications. To be sure, the universe of relevant facts does not 
define the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, and 
the characterization offered here does not always hold. However, 
given that the Justices sometimes take advantage of the inchoate 
lines between the two to pursue substantive goals,138 it is important 
to recognize that the choice between facial and as-applied challenges 
can shape the facts at issue.  
1. Shelby County 
The Court treated the lawsuit in Shelby County as a facial 
challenge.139 This move limited the universe of facts the Court 
considered. It also greatly expanded the reach of its decision.  
Shelby County brought the case as a facial challenge, seeking to 
invalidate the coverage formula in its entirety, as opposed to 
challenging only its applicability to the county itself.140 
Notwithstanding this plaintiff ’s initial framing, the Court’s stated 
 
 136.  See, e.g., Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules 
Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 307–18 (2012). 
 137.  See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 662 (3d ed. 1988) (“Challenges to the validity of a statute as applied to 
specific facts . . . turn necessarily on a determination of what the adjudicative facts were.”). 
However, it is important to note that the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is 
muddy and shifting. As Professor Metzger points out, this formulation was absent from later 
editions of Hart and Wechsler’s Federal Courts casebook. See Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Facial 
Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (2005). 
 138.  See Metzger, supra note 137, at 880. 
 139.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the coverage 
formula “can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance”); see also 
id. at 2644–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s decision to treat the case as a 
facial challenge). 
 140.  See id. at 2621–22 (majority opinion). 
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preference is to treat cases as as-applied challenges.141 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court generally, and the Roberts Court in particular, has 
repeatedly resisted facial challenges on the theory that litigants can 
instead bring narrower as-applied attacks (on remand, if need be).142 
Had the Court treated the case as an as-applied challenge, it 
would have asked whether preclearance was an appropriate remedy 
for voter discrimination in Shelby County itself or perhaps in the 
State of Alabama. If the Court needed more information to make 
this determination, it could have remanded the case for jurisdiction-
specific factual findings. Instead, by permitting the case to proceed as 
a facial attack, the Court was able to brush aside evidence that voter 
discrimination persisted in Shelby County.143  
Because it treated the case as a facial challenge, the Court 
reviewed the propriety of preclearance for all jurisdictions subject to 
it rather than focusing on the record of voter discrimination of the 
jurisdiction at issue in this case. In so doing, the Court made it easier 
to find a constitutional violation. By pointing to broad national 
trends indicating changed times and reduced discrimination, the 
Justices were able to sidestep evidence that Shelby County’s and 
Alabama’s records of voter discrimination were damning enough to 
merit preclearance.144 
The Court’s opinion certainly would have been harder to write 
had it looked more closely at the state’s and county’s histories. More 
 
 141.  See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773 (2009) (“One recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s 
jurisprudence to date is its resistance to facial constitutional challenges and preference for as-
applied litigation.”). 
 142.  See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 
(2008) (“Facial challenges are disfavored.”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1987) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which 
the Act would be valid.”); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–21 (1960); Yazoo & Miss. 
Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912); Fallon, supra note 135, at 
917; Metzger, supra note 141, at 773. 
 143.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (contending that the dissent’s argument that the 
Court should consider Shelby County’s actual record of voting discrimination “is like saying 
that a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of stopping all redheads cannot complain about 
that policy, if it turns out his license has expired”). 
 144.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 441–43 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing 
history of voter discrimination in Shelby County), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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specifically, the Court’s decision to treat the case as a facial challenge 
allowed it to ignore important trial court findings about the record 
of voter discrimination in the jurisdictions at issue. As the district 
court explained, in the decades since the initial passage of the 
VRA,  Alabama had a substantial history of creating at-large 
electoral  districts designed to keep its black citizens “politically 
downtrodden.”145 Between 1982 and 2005, Alabama had the 
second-highest rate of successful voter discrimination suits under 
section 2 of the VRA.146 In the 1980s, Shelby County itself had been 
a party to litigation challenging these practices and had entered into 
a consent decree agreeing to change its at-large system to a single-
member district with one majority-black district.147 As recently as 
2008, the U.S. Attorney General objected to a redistricting plan that 
would have eliminated the sole majority-black district in a city within 
Shelby County.148 
Had the Court considered only this narrower history of voter 
discrimination in the jurisdiction at issue, it would have been 
substantially harder to conclude that preclearance was unfairly 
burdening Shelby County itself. As Justice Ginsburg summarized in 
dissent, “Alabama’s sorry history of § 2 violations alone provides 
sufficient justification for Congress’ determination in 2006 that the 
State should remain subject to § 5’s preclearance requirement.”149 In 
fact, Shelby County itself did not challenge the specific application of 
preclearance to any of its proposed voting changes.150 But by viewing 
the case through a broad nationwide lens, the Court was able to 
highlight that “things have changed,”151 without having to confront 
evidence that things may not have changed enough in the very 
county that initiated the litigation. 
 
 145.  See id. at 442 (citing Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1357 (M.D. 
Ala. 1986)). 
 146.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Mississippi had the 
highest rate. See id. 
 147.  See Shelby Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 442–43. 
 148.  See id. 
 149.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 150.  See Shelby Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 
 151.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (majority opinion). 
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The Court’s treatment also tremendously extended the reach of 
its decision. Because the Court vindicated Shelby County’s facial 
challenge, its ruling invalidated the coverage formula in its entirety, 
not just as applied to the plaintiff. As a result, the Court effectively 
removed preclearance as a tool for combatting voter discrimination 
nationwide. The Court did so despite the VRA’s “exceptionally 
broad severability provision,”152 indicating that “[i]f any provision of 
[this Act] or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is 
held invalid, the remainder of [the Act] and the application of the 
provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other 
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”153 The Court’s 
aggressive rejection of the entire preclearance scheme, then, ignored 
both Congress’s facts and legal instructions. 
2. Citizens United 
Shelby County’s breadth is notable, but it is not anomalous. In 
Citizens United, the Court also declared the statute in question 
facially unconstitutional.154 Indeed, the Court’s move in Citizens 
United was even more aggressive, converting an as-applied challenge 
into a facial one.155 As in Shelby County, the decision to treat the case 
as a facial challenge helped the Court simultaneously evade 
important facts and extend the reach of the decision. 
The plaintiffs in Citizens United brought an as-applied challenge, 
contending, inter alia, that section 441b of BCRA was 
unconstitutional as applied to Hillary: The Movie.156 Nevertheless, 
the Court treated the challenge as a facial one.157 As Justice Stevens 
pointed out, had the plaintiff itself brought a facial challenge, “the 
parties could have developed, through the normal process of 
litigation, a record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual 
 
 152.  Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 153.  52 U.S.C. § 10313 (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 
1973p (2012)). 
 154.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321, 330 (2010) (justifying decision to 
treat case as a facial challenge). 
 155.  See id. at 398–99 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 156.  See id. at 321 (majority opinion). 
 157.  See id. at 330 (“[I]t is necessary to consider . . . the facial validity of §441b’s 
expenditure ban.”). 
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burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and 
unions.”158 Citizens United, however, had abandoned its facial 
challenge in the district court,159 so there was no such record. As we 
have already seen, the Court ignored the facts that prompted 
legislative action. By recharacterizing the as-applied challenge as a 
facial one, it similarly avoided considering facts about the effects of 
the law. 
Also like Shelby County, the decision in Citizens United to treat 
the challenge as a facial one made it easier to strike down the statute. 
Had the Court actually grappled with facts about the role of money 
in politics, it might have been harder to conclude that the statute 
was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental 
interest. By invalidating the statute on its face without the benefit of 
a district court record, the Court could emphasize the statute’s 
imposition on free speech without engaging with the harms the 
statute sought to remedy. 
Of course, it is possible that a fully developed district court 
record would have supported the majority’s holding.160 Perhaps, for 
example, the trial court could have found that money finds its way 
into politics anyway,161 so that section 441b was not effective enough 
to justify its intrusion on free speech. However, by ruling without 
the benefit of any record, the Court was able to reach its desired 
result without having to grapple with facts about the law’s effects. 
Finally, and again like Shelby County, the Court’s facial 
invalidation of section 441b increased the significance of its decision. 
Quite simply, the ruling invalidated the statutory provision in all its 
 
 158.  Id. at 399 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 159.  See Motion for Summary Judgment by Citizens United, Citizens United v. FEC, 
530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 52); Stipulation Regarding Count 5 of the 
Amended Complaint by Citizens United, Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp.2d 274 
(D.D.C. 2008) (No. 53); Order Dismissing Count 5 of the Amended Complaint, Citizens 
United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp.2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 54); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
396–97 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Citizens United 
“expressly abandoned its facial challenge”). 
 160.  But see McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010). 
 161.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“[P]olitical money, like water, has to go 
somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air.”). 
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applications, rather than just as applied to one plaintiff. A narrower, 
as-applied holding could have permitted the plaintiff to show 
Hillary: The Movie in the days leading up to an election but would 
have reserved for future cases the constitutionality of section 441b 
applied to other entities in other contexts.162 The Court, instead, 
struck down the provision in all its applications, thus issuing a 
decision with a tremendous reach. 
3. NFIB 
Though NFIB did not use the language of facial and as-applied 
challenges, it too can be thought of in those terms. The Chief 
Justice’s and joint dissent’s approaches essentially converted an as-
applied challenge (brought by uninsured non-free riders163) to a facial 
challenge (seeking to invalidate the individual mandate as applied to 
all individuals, including free riders who consume health care 
without paying for it). As in Shelby County and Citizens United, 
this  move allowed these five Justices to ignore inconvenient 
facts,  steer  the decision toward its desired outcome, and write 
broader opinions.164 
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters took for granted that the 
government was forcing the plaintiffs unwillingly into a market in 
which they otherwise would not have participated. In this way, these 
five Justices assumed that the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional as applied to everyone without health insurance. 
But it is difficult to contend that Congress lacks the Commerce 
Clause power to impose a mandate on health-care free riders.165 To 
the contrary, uninsured persons who receive but do not pay for 
 
 162.  See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 135, at 946 (noting that the Court could have held the 
relevant BCRA provision invalid only as applied to the party before it, but instead it found the 
provision invalid on its face). 
 163.  By “uninsured non-free riders,” I refer to uninsured persons who do not pass their 
health care costs onto society at large, either because they never consume health care or 
because they are able to pay out of pocket for the health care costs they incur. 
 164.  Admittedly, the Court ultimately upheld the mandate. See supra notes 103–04, 
133–34 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Probably for this reason, the challengers made sure to select plaintiffs who, though 
uninsured, expected to be able to pay out of pocket for their health care needs. See, e.g., 
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270–
71 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
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health care harm everyone else by passing their costs onto the rest of 
society. Simply put, the free rider’s actions surely impacts interstate 
commerce, especially in the aggregate.166 
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters completely ignored this 
complication.167 Indeed, they did not seek any assurance that the 
plaintiffs would not free ride off the system. For example, these 
Justices could have perhaps asked the plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
they had not been free riders in the past and that they had the 
savings to pay out of pocket for unexpected health care expenses. 
Such an approach, though unwieldy, would at least have sought to 
identify regulated individuals whose behavior did not substantially 
affect interstate commerce. 
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters, though, did not wrestle 
with such problems, instead treating each uninsured person as 
though she were entirely out of the health care market.168 The Chief 
Justice, indeed, brushed aside Congress’s claim that uninsured 
people will consume health care as mere “prophesied future 
activity.”169 As noted above, this argument ignores congressional 
findings indicating that every year many uninsured persons do 
consume health care for which they do not pay. By ignoring this 
evidence, the Chief Justice and joint dissenters could contend that 
the individual mandate was beyond Congress’s commerce power in 
all instances, even as applied to those free riders whose behavior 
unquestionably impacts interstate commerce and partially prompted 
the legislation in the first place. The Justices, in other words, treated 
 
 166.  Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own 
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him 
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that 
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”). 
 167.  It is possible that these five Justices thought the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional as applied to uninsured non-free riders and that this unconstitutional 
application of the statute could not be severed from any constitutional applications of the 
mandate. However, though these Justices engaged in a lengthy discussion of whether the 
entire statute must fall due to the invalidity of the individual mandate and the Medicaid 
expansion, they did not explore whether one could sever constitutional and unconstitutional 
applications of the individual mandate. Compare NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 
(2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.), with id. at 2668–76 (joint dissent). 
 168.  See id. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and 
dissenting in part). 
 169.  See id. at 2590 (majority opinion). 
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the case as a facial challenge to all applications of the statute, rather 
than an as-applied challenge by non-free riders (i.e., uninsured 
persons with a plausible argument that they did not impact 
interstate commerce). 
In fairness, Commerce Clause challenges, such as United States v. 
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, usually proceed facially.170 To 
that extent, the Court’s decision to treat the mandate challenge as a 
facial one seems unremarkable. But NFIB differed in important 
respects from both those cases. Both Lopez and Morrison emphasized 
that the statutes at issue regulated non-economic activities (guns in 
school zones and violence against women).171 As a result, the Court 
would not permit Congress to view these activities in the aggregate 
as substantially affecting interstate commerce.172 To this extent, the 
statutes there were unconstitutional in all their applications.  
By contrast, the argument that an uninsured person is not 
engaged in economic activity is plausible only if that person never 
seeks health care. If a person consumes health care without paying 
for it, she is actively passing the costs of her health care consumption 
onto the medical provider and, ultimately, society. Phrased 
differently, such a free rider is actively engaged in economic activity 
that substantially affects interstate commerce. By contrast, the man 
who carries a gun into a school zone or who abuses his wife is simply 
not engaged in economic activity (even if his activity may have 
economic effects). 
Given Lopez and Morrison’s reasoning, the Court’s decisions to 
treat those cases as facial challenges make sense. No application of 
either statute regulated economic activity. By contrast, the free rider is 
plainly making an economic decision that impacts interstate 
commerce. Accordingly, the Chief Justice’s and joint dissenters’ 
opinions must be read as asserting either that the existence of the 
free rider is uncertain and therefore legally irrelevant, or that the 
 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995); David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative 
Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 62–68 (2006); Luke Meier, Facial 
Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L. J. 1557, 1563 (2010); Metzger, supra note 
137, at 905. 
 171.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 172.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–10; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
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unconstitutional application of the mandate to some non-free riders 
should sink the mandate’s constitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause in all its applications. It is not entirely clear which argument 
the Chief Justice and joint dissenters were advancing, but, either 
way, these Justices treated the case as a facial challenge.  
Even assuming arguendo that these five Justices were correct that 
the mandate exceeded Congress’s authority as applied to uninsured 
non-free riders, it is strange that that unconstitutional application 
should invalidate the mandate in all its applications. Federal statutes 
passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause are typically valid if they 
regulate some economic activity substantially impacting interstate 
commerce.173 The Court historically has indicated it would uphold 
statutes that, in some applications, may regulate activity that does 
not affect interstate commerce.174 Ever since 1937, the assumption 
has been that so long as the statute in some regard regulates 
economic behavior substantially affecting interstate commerce, the 
statute would stand.175  
The five Justices in NFIB reversed this presumption, suggesting 
(but not stating) that a statute enacted pursuant to the commerce 
power must fall if some of its applications reach behavior not 
implicating interstate commerce. This move made it possible for five 
Justices to conclude that the mandate exceeded the commerce 
power. It also allowed the Justices to ignore Congress’s findings that 
the problem of free riders substantially affected interstate commerce. 
Indeed, neither the Chief Justice nor the joint dissenters tried to 
identify just how many people subject to the individual mandate 
were, in fact, non-free riders. Presumably, a substantial portion of the 
regulated individuals were or would soon become free riders whose 
behavior impacts interstate commerce. Some people, in fact, forego 
health insurance knowing that they soon will consume health care 
 
 173.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 174.  See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302–04 (1964) (upholding 
application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act to a restaurant and rejecting the appellees’ 
contention that the Court should engage in a “case-by-case determination . . . that racial 
discrimination in a particular restaurant affects commerce.”). 
 175.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. There is some disagreement about whether the test 
should be whether the activity “affects” or “substantially affects” interstate commerce. 
Compare id. at 559, with id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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for which they will be unable to pay. Congress itself had found that 
very large numbers of Americans contribute to the very free-rider 
problem Congress was trying to address, thus imposing enormous 
costs on to the national economy.176  
Admittedly, it would have been difficult to distinguish ex ante 
between free riders and uninsured persons who will not burden the 
system. However, that difficulty should have cut in favor of the 
mandate’s constitutionality. Given that the great number of free 
riders substantially raised health care costs for everyone else, the 
Chief Justice’s decision to focus exclusively on the non-free rider is 
highly questionable. This approach effectively vindicated a facial 
attack on the mandate, even though the legal argument applied 
only  to a subset (probably only a small subset) of the 
regulated individuals. 
* * * 
It would be misleading to characterize the Court’s approach to 
facial challenges here as plainly erroneous. After all, the Court not 
infrequently entertains and vindicates facial challenges, 
notwithstanding its rhetoric that facial challenges ought to be rare.177 
What is more noticeable, though, is that the Court made this crucial 
move in each opinion with minimal explanation and with no 
acknowledgement that doing so excluded from the Court’s 
consideration facts that reasonable observers might deem central to 
the cases at hand. 
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters in NFIB did not mention 
the matter at all, discussing the mandate as though the constitutional 
issue were identical for free riders and non-free riders alike.178 The 
 
 176.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E)–(F) (2012). 
 177.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a 
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid.”); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1985); Michael C. Dorf, Facial 
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238 (1994) (pointing out that 
the Supreme Court’s stated approach disfavoring facial challenges does not “accurately 
reflect[] the Court’s practice”); Fallon, supra note 135, at 935; Metzger, supra note 137, 
at  878 (“[T]he Court accepts facial challenges far more frequently than its stated 
doctrine  suggests.”). 
 178.  See supra Section I.B.3. 
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Court in Shelby County did not justify its decision to treat the case as 
a facial challenge.179 And though Citizens United tried to justify its 
decision to convert the case into a facial challenge,180 it failed to 
explain convincingly why it ought not remand the case for fact 
finding about the statute’s effects.  
The apparent allure of facial challenges in these cases was not just 
that they enabled the Justices to weave around inconvenient facts, 
but also that they enabled the Justices to write broader opinions than 
would have otherwise been possible.181 Indeed, this judicial 
aggrandizement is consistent with other moves in these cases 
enhancing the Justices’ power. In NFIB, for example, the Chief 
Justice need not have discussed the Commerce Clause issue at all, 
given that it upheld the individual mandate under Congress’s taxing 
power.182 Citizens United need not have reached the facial 
constitutional issue, given that it could have been decided on narrow 
statutory grounds or as an as-applied constitutional challenge.183 
Indeed, in that case, the Court requested additional briefing and 
rescheduled oral argument precisely to inject into the case a 
broad  First Amendment issue.184 To this extent, the Court’s 
treatment  of  facts and facial challenges in these cases is part of a 
broader  pattern  of aggressive judicial efforts to issue far-reaching 
constitutional decisions. 
II. EXPLANATIONS 
The Court’s avoidance of inconvenient facts in these cases 
is  striking. One would think that the Justices would at least want to 
consider the facts motivating federal legislation, even if they 
ultimately deemed those facts insufficient to support the statute at 
 
 179.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2644–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 180.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC 558 U.S. 310, 329–30 (2010). 
 181.  Cf. Metzger, supra note 137, at 880 (arguing that the Justices “are less concerned 
with” treating the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges consistently and more 
concerned “with results in particular cases”). 
 182.  See supra Section I.A.3. 
 183.  See Briffault, supra note 93, at 663 (noting “several legal theories” that would have 
permitted Citizens United to pay for the movie in question that would not have required the 
Court to invalidate laws banning corporate campaign spending). 
 184.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 322 (directing parties to file supplemental briefs 
addressing constitutional questions). 
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issue. After all, core constitutional doctrines, like ripeness and 
standing, are premised partially on the notion that judges decide 
cases more wisely when they have concrete disputes with developed 
facts in front of them.185  
To the extent the majority in each of these cases found creative 
ways to decide important constitutional cases without considering 
seemingly relevant facts, it is important to explore why the Justices 
act as they do. It is worth noting that no single explanation for the 
Court’s approach is fully satisfactory, and some apply to some cases 
more convincingly than to others. Nevertheless, collectively the 
various explanations examined here help shed light on the practice 
and the Court’s constitutional decision making more generally.  
A. The Doctrinal Explanation: (Novel) Constitutional First Principles 
Perhaps the most obvious explanation behind the Court’s 
aggressive avoidance of facts, including congressional facts, is that 
the Court cared more about deeper constitutional norms and less 
about the facts prompting congressional policy. In each case here, 
the Court’s analysis largely sidestepped facts, instead focusing on 
what the majority perceived to be constitutional first principles. 
Interestingly, these principles were deeply contested and, in some 
cases, wholly novel. Nevertheless, these principles were very much at 
the heart of the majority Justices’ theories of these cases. 
Citizens United presents the most obvious example—and the one 
example in which the principle in question already was important in 
the case law. The Court rejected the relevance of Congress’s findings 
that corporate campaign finance contributions can lead to an undue 
and corrupting corporate influence over the political process.186 
Only  quid pro quo corruption, the Court said, mattered for free 
speech purposes.187 
 
 185.  See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 471–72 
(2008) (summarizing views of the functions of standing); Fallon, supra note 135, at 960. 
 186.  See supra Section I.A.2. 
 187.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”). 
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While the Court cited Buckley for this proposition,188 a fuller 
explanation rests with the Court’s understanding of representative 
democracy. Quoting his own opinion from McConnell, Justice 
Kennedy explained: 
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative 
politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor 
certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and 
contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that 
a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a 
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another 
is that the candidate will respond by producing those 
political  outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised 
on  responsiveness.189 
The Court’s vision of representative democracy, then, accepts 
rent seeking and speech supporting it as inevitable features of our 
governmental system. On this view, Congress’s evidence that 
campaign contributions “corrupt,” established only what Justice 
Kennedy deemed inherent in our governmental system. Many 
businesses and other interest groups contribute to political 
candidates precisely because they hope that those candidates, if 
elected, will pass laws favorable to those contributors. Far from 
lamenting this state of affairs, the Court accepted it as inevitable.190 
Accordingly, no congressional findings short of quid pro quo 
corruption could justify regulations that so substantially impinged on 
campaign contributors’ First Amendment interests. 
Shelby County’s attitude toward congressional facts also rested on 
constitutional first principles. The Court began with the proposition 
that state sovereignty generally, and equal state sovereignty in 
particular, are constitutional principles of the highest importance.191 
Building on this premise, the majority insisted that only 
 
 188.  See id. 
 189.  Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010)). 
 190.  See Sitkoff, supra note 81, at 1106. 
 191.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) (describing the VRA as “a 
drastic departure from basic principles of federalism” and “an equally dramatic departure from 
the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty”). 
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extraordinary circumstances could justify intruding on these 
principles. The Court accepted that the VRA’s “strong medicine” 
may once have been necessary to combat the insidious practice of 
voter discrimination but insisted that it was constitutionally 
illegitimate absent “exceptional conditions.”192 Whereas the Jim 
Crow South’s blatant voter discrimination, which often prevented 
African Americans from casting ballots at all, rose to this level,193 
more subtle and contemporary forms of voter discrimination 
did not.194 
The Court’s point was not that these barriers did not exist. 
Rather, the Court assumed that these barriers were not as serious as 
they had been when Congress first passed the VRA in 1965. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that whatever the factual record, it 
could not support Congress’s intrusion on state sovereignty. 
Additionally, the Court’s opinion rested on the latent but 
palpable principle of color blindness. During oral argument, the 
majority Justices signaled that they saw the VRA as a racial 
entitlement—that is, as a governmental benefit bestowed upon racial 
minorities (and, in particular, African Americans).195 Some Justices, 
thus, signaled that a statute that treated states differently and 
extended special protections to certain racial minorities was 
unconstitutional absent especially robust findings. The constitutional 
bar, in fact, was so high that the Court did not even need to look at 
the evidence to conclude that it was not good enough.196 
Like Shelby County, NFIB’s Commerce Clause analysis also 
ignored congressional facts in service of federalism. The Chief 
Justice, for instance, quoting The Federalist No. 48, openly worried 
that without a firm judicial check on Congress, the federal legislature 
would be “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and 
 
 192.  Id. at 2618. 
 193.  See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966); MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 52–55, 85–86 (2004). 
 194.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109–478, at 6 (2006). 
 195.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(No.  1296). 
 196.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“Regardless of how to look at the record . . . no 
one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ 
and ‘rampant’ discrimination . . . in 1965.”). 
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drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”197 The joint dissenters 
similarly contended that “if every person comes within the 
Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple 
reason that he will one day engage in commerce, the idea of a 
limited Government power is at an end.”198 
This federalism principle dictated that Congress’s findings should 
not matter. Because Congress had relied on its findings about the 
serious economic consequences of uninsured persons to justify an 
unprecedented exercise of its commerce authority,199 these Justices 
recharacterized the very phenomenon Congress regulated as 
“inaction.” Given the federalism principles at stake, both the Chief 
Justice and the joint dissenters indicated that they would not accept 
a characterization of the facts that would permit Congress such 
broad commerce power. 
In one sense, these judicial statements were candid admissions 
that a normative constitutional preference for limited federal 
government was pushing aside seemingly key facts.200 That candor, 
however, can be understood also as an acknowledgement that these 
Justices—and the joint dissenters in particular—were prepared to 
characterize the facts however necessary to hold that the individual 
mandate exceeded the commerce power. On that account, it didn’t 
really matter whether Congress regulated behavior that substantially 
affected interstate commerce, because five Justices believed 
Congress  shouldn’t be regulating in that way, regardless of the 
underlying facts. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Court’s constitutional 
justifications for ignoring Congress’s facts in these cases rested on 
novel or, at best, deeply contested constitutional theories. For 
example, the distinction between action and inaction did not exist in 
Commerce Clause doctrine prior to NFIB. The Chief Justice 
justified this innovation by contending that “[a]llowing Congress to 
justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on 
 
 197.  NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison)). 
 198.  Id. at 2648 (joint dissent). 
 199.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (2012). 
 200.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could 
potentially make within the scope of federal regulation.”201 
However, this distinction between action and inaction is largely 
arbitrary.202 As Justice Ginsburg, quoting Judge Easterbrook, noted, 
“it is possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with 
the same effect.”203 As already discussed, while the Chief Justice and 
the joint dissenters painted a person’s failure to purchase health 
insurance as “inaction,” one could just as easily characterize it as an 
affirmative decision to impose one’s own medical expenses onto 
hospitals and society more generally. 
Even more to the point, this doctrinal distinction did not exist 
prior to NFIB and is, in fact, in tension with earlier Commerce 
Clause cases.204 Moreover, even if we accept the distinction, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to enact measures 
“plainly adapted” to accomplish Congress’s legitimate goals.205 ACA 
provisions forbidding insurance companies from denying coverage or 
charging higher prices to individuals with preexisting medical 
conditions plainly fall within the Commerce power.206 Without the 
individual mandate, however, those provisions would never work.207 
The individual mandate, then, was “‘reasonably adapted’ to the 
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power”208 and, 
therefore, valid under Necessary and Proper Clause precedent.  
The Chief Justice steered around this precedent on the theory 
that the individual mandate was not “proper,” because it interfered 
 
 201.  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587. 
 202.  See David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20. 
 203.  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting Archie v. Racine, 847 F. 2d 1211, 1213 
(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). 
 204.  See Strauss, supra note 202, at 20–23 (discussing Wickard and other early 
Commerce Clause cases); supra Sections I.A.3, I.B.3. 
 205.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); Strauss, supra 
note 202, at 9. 
 206.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 207.  See id. (explaining adverse selection problem that would arise if the guaranteed issue 
and community rating provisions were unaccompanied by the individual mandate). 
 208.  See id. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
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with the “structure of government.”209 However, as Justice Ginsburg 
explained, the Chief Justice cited just two cases for this proposition, 
both of which were easily distinguishable, because, unlike the 
individual mandate, they compelled state officials to act on behalf of 
the federal government.210 Regardless of whether it is persuasive, the 
Chief Justice’s approach charts new constitutional territory. The 
Chief Justice’s rejection of congressional facts in NFIB, then, is all 
the more notable, because it rested upon newfangled doctrine. 
Shelby County, too, rejected facts based primarily on new 
doctrine. While the Court had cited the principle of equal state 
sovereignty before, that concept had rested dormant for much of our 
constitutional history.211 Furthermore, that constitutional principle 
was often narrow, only requiring Congress to admit new states on 
the same terms as the original thirteen states.212 Thus, as Professor 
Litman argues, “Shelby County broadened the equal sovereignty 
principle beyond how it had been used in prior cases.”213 The Court, 
for its part, cited its 2009 decision in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District v. Holder,214 but in that case the Court found that the 
jurisdiction in question was eligible to seek bailout from preclearance 
obligations.215 The Court, therefore, decided Northwest Austin as a 
matter of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation. 
Though Northwest Austin discussed the equal state sovereignty 
principle, that principle did not decide the case. 
Finally, while Citizens United’s narrow view of corruption was 
already part of First Amendment doctrine, the majority opinion was 
also at odds with important First Amendment precedents and 
historical understandings.216 Cases like Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
 
 209.  See id. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 210.  See id. at 2627 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part) (discussing Chief Justice’s analysis of New York v. United States 
and Printz v. United States). 
 211.  See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1228–
29 (2016). 
 212.  See id. at 1211. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013). 
 215.  See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009). 
 216.  See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 395 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
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of Commerce217 and McConnell v. FEC218 had upheld campaign 
finance restrictions, including (in McConnell’s case) the very BCRA 
provision at issue in Citizens United.219 Unlike Citizens United, those 
cases had wrestled explicitly with the government interest in 
campaign finance regulation.220  
Similarly, FEC v. National Right to Work Commission had also 
unanimously recognized a sufficient governmental interest in 
“ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by” 
corporations would not “be used to incur political debts from 
legislators who are aided by the contributions.”221 That case had 
likewise accepted that Congress’s decision to place special limitations 
on corporations’ campaign spending “reflects a permissible 
assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral 
process.”222 Thus, as Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Citizens 
United, the majority’s approach overruled or disavowed a long line 
of case law upholding campaign finance regulations.223  
The Court’s willingness to accept corporate rent-seeking also 
ignored concerns about the dangers of corruption dating back to the 
Founding era. As Professor Teachout argues, the United States, 
throughout its history, has a tradition of viewing corruption broadly 
 
(1990). See generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 2 (2014) (discussing 
deep concerns about corruption, broadly defined, in American history); Zephyr Teachout, The 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2009) (“The Constitution carries 
within it an anti-corruption principle, much like the separation-of-powers principle, 
or federalism.”). 
 217.  Austin, 494 U.S. 652. 
 218.  McConnell, 540 U.S. 93. 
 219.  Admittedly, the rationale in Austin was somewhat different from that asserted by 
the government to defend the statute at issue in Citizens United. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 
(“[T]he corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form . . . that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”). 
 220.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (“We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at 
‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660)). 
 221.  FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm’n, 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982). 
 222.  Id. at 209. 
 223.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 395 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); FEC 
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 
(1986); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)). 
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to include not only “blatant bribes and theft from the public till . . . 
[but also] many situations where politicians and public institutions 
serve private interests at the public’s expense.”224 This type of anti-
rent-seeking principle, arguably baked into the Constitution in 
provisions like the Emoluments Clause,225 calls into question the 
majority’s assumptions about representative democracy under the 
Constitution. While the depth and scope of this anti-corruption 
principle is certainly contestable,226 its very existence raises questions 
about whether the Court’s preferred constitutional first principle was 
necessarily correct.  
Of course, just because the majority relied on novel or deeply 
contested constitutional principles in these cases does not necessarily 
mean that those principles are wrong. New doctrines sometimes 
become canonical. Nevertheless, it is striking that the Court’s efforts 
to avoid grappling with inconvenient facts relied largely on 
doctrinal innovations.227 
Indeed, the majority’s willingness to brush aside these facts in 
the service of new or deeply contested constitutional doctrine 
suggests that the Justices here are guided less by constitutional 
precedent and more by the spirit of innovation. The Court’s 
aggressive rejection of Congress’s facts—and its related confidence in 
its own view of the world—speak, then, not to passive jurists 
applying clear legal principles to the case before them, but rather to 
Justices aggressively moving the law in their preferred directions.228 
The Court may have hoped to seem apolitical when it ignored the 
 
 224.  See TEACHOUT, supra note 216, at 2. 
 225.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or 
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, 
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”); NORMAN L. 
EISEN ET AL., GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, 
MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 5 (2016), https://www.brookings. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1.pdf (arguing that the 
Emoluments Clause was a broad “anti-corruption measure”). 
 226.  See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 404–17 (2012) (arguing that the 
Founders were not “obsessed” with corruption and that the anti-corruption principle extends 
not to elected federal positions but only to appointed federal officers). 
 227.  See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Morrison 
v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 228.  See generally ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS (2012). 
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facts and focused on constitutional principles, but its disregard of 
inconvenient facts instead suggests deep commitment to an 
ideological agenda. 
B. The Political Explanation: The Conservative Counter Revolution 
We thus turn to a second and closely related explanation: 
political norms. In each of the cases discussed here, a conservative 
majority of the Court voted to invalidate parts of federal statutes 
serving progressive agendas. As Professor Karlan has argued, whereas 
conservatives once advocated for judicial restraint as a reaction 
against the perceived excesses of the Warren Court, judicial 
conservatives in more recent years have used the judicial power to 
attack constitutional doctrines undergirding liberal legislative 
accomplishments.229 This is not a judicial conservatism devoted to 
the passive virtues of judicial modesty,230 but a far more aggressive 
conservatism that promotes the Republican Party’s agenda through 
court decisions.231 
Of course, politics alone cannot explain constitutional law, and 
the media sometimes over-emphasizes political factors when it 
reports on judicial decisions. Nevertheless, it is striking that the 
majority Justices on these issues—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—were all appointed by 
Republican presidents.232 By contrast, the dissenters—Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—were all appointed by 
Democratic presidents and predictably share more liberal tendencies. 
Only the Republican-appointed Justice Stevens, who wrote the 
dissent in Citizens United shortly before retiring, took a position 
that departed from the likely preferences of the party of the 
appointing President (and Stevens was appointed by President Ford, 
a very moderate Republican by contemporary standards).233 
 
 229.  See Karlan, supra note 81, at 10. 
 230.  See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term–Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
 231.  See Karlan, supra note 81, at 11, 70. 
 232.  As noted above, though NFIB ultimately upheld the individual mandate, the five 
conservative Justices comprised the majority on the Commerce Clause issue. 
 233.  Of course, the Chief Justice’s vote to uphold the individual mandate on Taxing 
Clause grounds also departed from Republican Party preferences. Similarly, Justices Breyer’s 
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Given this stark divide, it should not be surprising that the 
decisions here can be seen as conservative in both constitutional and 
political terms. In constitutional terms, as just discussed, each 
opinion vindicated constitutional principles generally associated with 
conservative thought.234 In crasser political terms, the opinions also 
plausibly could be understood to serve conservative ends. The 
majority of jurisdictions subject to VRA preclearance leaned 
Republican,235 and preclearance sometimes blocked changes to 
voting procedures that would have likely harmed Democratic 
candidates.236 Perhaps predictably, shortly after Shelby County, North 
Carolina enacted a vote-suppression law, which likely limited the 
right to vote among low income and minority voters, who tend to 
vote more Democratic.237 While litigation under section 2 of the 
VRA may discourage (or even halt) some other state-wide vote-
suppression efforts,238 the absence of pre-clearance is probably more 
apparent in local jurisdictions, where vote-suppression receives less 
attention and is more likely to fly under the radar.239 As a result, 
localities can more easily make changes to voting rules, which 
 
and Kagan’s votes on the Spending Clause issue in NFIB departed from Democratic Party 
preferences. As these examples demonstrate, we ought not overstate the effect of political 
preferences on judicial decision making. 
 234.  See supra Section II.A. 
 235.  See Editors, Leave the Voting Rights Act Alone, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/node/422408/print (stating that the jurisdictions that had 
been subject to preclearance, though originally Democratic in the 1960s, were by the 2000s 
mostly in heavily Republican states). 
 236.  See id. (stating that the preclearance requirements generally would be more likely to 
help Democrats today); Heather Gerken, Opting into the Voting Rights Act, 
REUTERS  (Jan.  30,  2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/30/opting-
into-the-voting-rights-act. 
 237.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 72 (2014); Jamie Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby 
County v. Holder?, WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2014/07/07/how-has-voting-changed-since-shelby-county-v-holder/?utm_term 
=. 272394194f7a; Theodore R. Johnson, Why Are African-Americans Such Loyal Democrats 
When They Are So Ideologically Diverse?, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/28/can-trump-win-black-vote
s-what-we-know-from-5-decades-of-black-voting-data/?utm_term=.4caf7f19281f. 
 238.  See Kathleen M. Stoughton, Note, A New Approach to Voter ID Challenges: Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 292 (2013) (discussing the possibility of 
section 2 voting rights litigation). 
 239.  See Tokaji, supra note 237, at 72. 
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previously would have been subject to preclearance. Such changes 
likely dilute minority voting power.240 While the complete effects of 
the decision are complicated and difficult to measure, Shelby County, 
as a political matter, likely favored Republicans more 
than Democrats.241 
Citizens United also seems to help conservative causes. While 
both Democratic and Republican candidates can benefit from 
corporate independent expenditures, corporations sometimes make 
such expenditures hoping that their candidate, if elected, will 
decrease burdensome regulations.242 The Republican Party, of 
course, generally champions deregulation. It therefore should not be 
surprising that fundraising rules post-Citizens United may often 
favor Republicans.243 Additionally, while unions theoretically enjoy 
the same ability as corporations to spend general treasury funds to 
influence elections under the Citizens United framework, unions face 
additional constraints that corporations don’t because union dues 
 
 240.  See id. at 72 (“[P]reclearance was most effective in curbing redistricting plans and 
other practices thought to weaken minority representation . . . .”); Jon Greenbaum et al., 
Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 822 
(2014) (noting that Congress determined repeatedly in the decades after 1965 that section 5 
of the VRA “was still needed because of efforts to dilute minority voting strength”); Keesha 
M. Middlemass, The Need to Resurrect Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 J. CIVIL 
RIGHTS & ECON. DEV. 61, 102 (2015).  
 241.  See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 231 (2016) 
(classifying Shelby County as ideologically conservative); Tokaji, supra note 237, at 76 (“The 
conventional wisdom is that these [voting] laws will hurt Democrats more than 
Republicans.”); Vann R. Newkirk II, The Battle for North Carolina, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/the-battle-for-north-carolina 
/501257 (stating that immediately after Shelby County, North Carolina Republicans began 
passing laws restricting voting access for minorities). 
 242.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1559 (2005) (“Enron developed its political capital—making large 
political contributions and building relationships with state and federal government officials—
in order to obtain regulatory changes that would enable it to build its energy 
trading market.”). 
 243.  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
283, 285–86 (2014) (noting that Republicans enjoyed a “substantial financial edge” in the 
2012 election); Anu Narayanswamy et al., Money Raised as of Dec. 31, WASH. POST, https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/campaign-finance/ (stating that 
for the candidates other than Trump and Clinton, 13% of the Democratic funding was from 
super PACs and other independent groups and 33% of the Republican funding was from these 
groups) (last updated Feb. 1, 2017). 
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payments make up much of their treasury funds.244 The result is an 
asymmetry that favors corporations over unions.245 
The conservatives in NFIB, too, favored a politically conservative 
outcome, attacking the Obama administration’s most important 
policy accomplishment. Of course, the Court ended up upholding 
most of the law, including the controversial individual mandate. 
However, the Court did invalidate a portion of the statute extending 
Medicaid to more individuals, essentially rendering that provision 
optional for states.246 Moreover, even in upholding the individual 
mandate, the Chief Justice fired a warning shot across Congress’s 
bow.247 Indeed, by upholding the mandate on taxing, rather than 
commerce, grounds, the Chief Justice may have limited Congress’s 
regulatory authority. Taxes, after all, are politically unpopular.248 
To be clear, the point here is not to accuse the Justices of 
consciously deciding cases to advance political goals. Empirical 
studies typically conclude that judges do not have conscious political 
goals.249 The Justices do not think of themselves as politicians, and 
there certainly were plausible legal arguments in favor of the Court’s 
outcomes in each of these cases. Nevertheless, it is striking that the 
Justices who disregarded facts undergirding the legislation were all 
appointed by presidents of the party more likely to oppose the 
policies at issue.250 Indeed, as we shall see, political preferences likely 
filter into Justices’ unconscious biases. To this extent, politics 
probably drives the Justices’ decision-making more than they realize. 
 
 
 244.  See Karlan, supra note 81, at 40 (describing limitations on unions’ ability to spend 
general treasury funds to influence elections). 
 245.  See id. 
 246.  See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
 247.  See Karlan, supra note 81, at 47 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’ NFIB opinion as 
“probably the most grudging opinion ever to uphold a major piece of legislation”). 
 248.  See David Orentlicher, Constitutional Challenges to the Health Care Mandate: Based 
in Politics, Not Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 29 (2011). 
 249.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 25 (2008) (summarizing 
empirical studies noting that no attitudinal study demonstrates that “judges have conscious 
political goals”). 
 250.  See id. at 22–23 (noting that studies show that the political inclinations of judges 
invariably “explain much of the variance in judges’ votes on politically charged issues”). 
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C. The Psychological Explanation: Motivated Reasoning and 
Cultural Cognition 
Psychological research helps deepen our understanding of the 
doctrinal and political explanations. Whether or not they realize it, 
the Justices’ background assumptions and normative views inevitably 
shape their perceptions of the relevance of facts.251 Like people more 
generally, the Justices are subject to motivated reasoning—that is, to 
the unconscious tendency of individuals to process information in a 
manner more likely to reinforce existing beliefs than to form accurate 
ones.252 Thus, the Justices will naturally deem relevant those facts 
confirming their own worldview or vindicating their preferred 
constitutional principles. As the social psychologist Ziva Kunda 
explains, “when one wants to draw a particular conclusion, one feels 
obligated to construct a justification for that conclusion that would 
be plausible to a dispassionate observer. In doing so, one accesses 
only a biased subset of the relevant beliefs and rules.”253 
Professor Kahan has explored the related phenomenon of 
cultural cognition, which “refers to the tendency of individuals to 
conform their perceptions of risk and other policy-consequential 
facts to their cultural worldviews.”254 He argues persuasively that 
individuals are likely to seek out information that supports positions 
and groups they normatively favor.255 According to Professor Kahan 
and other scholars, Supreme Court Justices are hardly immune from 
this phenomenon.256  
The Justices’ background normative assumptions, cultural 
identities, and political views, then, likely played a role, perhaps even 
a substantial one, in their attitudes toward congressional and other 
 
 251.  Cf. SEGALL, supra note 228, at 6. 
 252.  See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term–Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2011); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 490–
91  (1990). 
 253.  Kunda, supra note 252, at 493. 
 254.  Kahan, supra note 252, at 23. 
 255.  See id. 
 256.  See id. at 20; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Incentives, Reputation, and the Glorious 
Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 637 (2000). 
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facts.257 The Justices are sophisticated actors, so they are probably 
less inclined to embrace fake facts than many members of the public. 
That said, the Justices’ ideological predispositions likely shape their 
attitudes toward particular factual propositions.  
In each of these cases, a conservative majority of Justices rejected 
statutory provisions that impinged on conservative values. In each 
case, the more liberal Justices would have sustained the challenged 
portions of the legislation. From this perspective, the Court may 
have rejected Congress’s facts because they were inconvenient 
obstacles to a conservative outcome the majority wanted to reach. 
Similarly, the more liberal Justices may have been more inclined to 
accept Congress’s facts because they helped support the outcome 
they were inclined to reach anyway.258 
Background norms and political preferences, then, are necessarily 
part of judicial decision-making.259 To be sure, professional judgment 
and legal training can help counter-act the pull of cognitive biases.260 
That said, while most judges follow clear law when it exists, 
Supreme  Court cases often present difficult issues about which 
reasonable  people can disagree.261 After all, many issues before the 
Supreme  Court divide lower courts.262 Moreover, Supreme Court 
constitutional cases, in particular, often offer little in the way of clear 
doctrine to cabin judicial discretion.263 Most Justices do not ignore 
the law to further their own political views, but it is natural and 
probably inevitable that a Justice’s “priors,” as Judge Posner calls 
 
 257.  See Kahan, supra note 252, at 19 (describing “the unconscious tendency of 
individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the 
formation of accurate beliefs”). 
 258.  See Devins, supra note 13, at 1175 (“Justices sympathetic to the goals of a 
particular statute, if not Congress itself, typically see the issue before them as one of fact; 
Justices skeptical of Congress, in contrast, are more apt to see the issue as one of law.”). 
 259.  See, e.g., Ross, supra note 13, at 2030 (noting that Court’s treatment of the 
legislative record “seemed to rest on whether they believed the evidence supporting the law in 
the first place”). 
 260.  See Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental 
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 
354 (2016). 
 261.  See POSNER, supra note 249, at 274. 
 262.  See U.S. SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing splits among U.S. court of appeals and/or state 
high courts as important factors to consider in decision about whether to grant certiorari). 
 263.  See POSNER, supra note 249, at 274. 
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them,264 will color the way she sees a contested legal question.265 In 
these cases, those leanings likely colored the Justices’ views of the 
relevance of Congress’s facts. 
D. The Practical Explanation: The Opinion-Writing Process 
Related to the psychological explanation is the opinion-writing 
process. Justices’ decisions about what to include and exclude from 
their opinions are, for better or worse, often driven by the Justices’ 
understandable desire to draft a coherent, persuasive opinion. 
Sometimes, Justices conceal factors because they realize that 
addressing those factors “will not write.”266 
To this extent, some Justices may sometimes downplay or 
altogether ignore facts that other Justices deem central to a case.267 
These moves may be conscious decisions to steer around 
inconvenient evidence, but they may also sometimes be quite 
unconscious attempts to defend the preferred outcome as 
persuasively as possible.268 As I have explained elsewhere, it is pithier 
to dismiss the relevance of certain facts categorically than to explain 
why, on balance, those facts should not guide the outcome given the 
context of a case.269 To this extent, the phenomenon explored here 
may partially be a product of the writing process as Justices seek to 
write an opinion that sounds convincing, even if upon closer 
inspection, that opinion dodges some crucial facts and arguments. 
 
 264.  See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court Is a Political Court. Republicans’ Actions 
Are Proof, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
supreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e1 
42-11e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html (“Priors are what we bring to a new question before 
we’ve had a chance to do research on it. They are attitudes, presuppositions derived from 
upbringing, from training, from personal and career experience, from religion and national 
origin and character and ideology and politics.”). 
 265.  See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
POSNER, supra note 249, at 269; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological 
Values and the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995). 
 266.  See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1321 (2008) [hereinafter Oldfather, Writing]. 
 267.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 723. 
 268.  See CARL BEREITER & MARLENE SCARDAMALIA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITTEN 
COMPOSITION 132 (1987); Oldfather, Writing, supra note 266, at 1308. 
 269.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 723. 
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The Court’s approach to facts, then, may sometimes be part of a 
larger phenomenon in which the Justices often make constitutional 
cases seem easier than they really are.270 
Relatedly, the writing process forces the author to address only 
her key points.271 Justices must make decisions about which facts to 
discuss and which to exclude. This process necessarily involves 
simplifications; a written opinion cannot fully capture the world’s 
true complexity (and many Supreme Court opinions are too long as 
it is).272 Sometimes, these simplifications are uncontroversial, because 
they dispense with facts that no decent lawyer or judge would 
consider relevant. However, sometimes in the attempt to write a 
more concise opinion, Justices shortchange facts that others would 
consider important or even crucial.273 
Of course, this explanation does not work equally well for every 
case. For example, it does not adequately explain the Chief Justice’s 
approach to facts in the Commerce Clause section of NFIB. It would 
have been far easier for the Chief Justice to dispense with the 
Commerce Clause analysis altogether, given his decision to uphold 
the mandate on Taxing Clause grounds. In this case, then, other 
explanations, such as constitutional first principles, are more 
persuasive. That said, this factor likely explains other cases, including 
Shelby County and Citizens United, which would have been more 
complicated opinions had the majority reached the same outcome 
while grappling thoroughly with facts it discarded. 
E. The Legalist Explanation: A Lack of Rules 
Another explanation is that no rules constrain appellate courts’ 
approaches to congressional findings or other kinds of legislative 
facts.274 Accordingly, judges and especially Supreme Court Justices 
 
 270.  See generally id. 
 271.  See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and 
the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 157 (2005). 
 272.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 724. 
 273.  Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 150 (1976); Robert 
A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 206–
07 (1990). 
 274.  See Gorod, supra note 10, at 57 (noting the “absence of established procedures” to 
guide courts’ approaches to legislative fact disputes). 
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are free to make assumptions about the relevance and content of 
various facts based on their own normative preferences, 
constitutional commitments, background knowledge, amicus brief 
perusal, and independent research.275 The Justices, in fact, can credit 
or discard these kinds of facts without having to check those 
assumptions against a trial court record, congressional findings, 
administrative agency facts, academic literature, or anything else. 
There is no law there. 
By contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts.276 Standards of appellate review similarly guide 
appellate consideration of trial court findings.277 In administrative 
law, the Administrative Procedure Act governs judicial review of 
various agency actions and factual findings.278 In each of these cases, 
black-letter law guides judicial consideration of certain kinds of facts. 
In reality, the rules can be quite malleable, but judges, lawyers, and 
governmental officials all cite the governing standards and at least 
ostensibly try to follow them. 
No such rules govern Supreme Court review of congressional 
facts or its treatment of the distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges. Even more importantly, no rules require—or plausibly 
could require—the Court to explain how it decided which facts are 
legally relevant. Though the Court has often obscured the line 
between legal and factual conclusions, the decision about which facts 
“count” is essentially a legal one. To this extent, even were the 
Court to accept presumptively the veracity of Congress’s factual 
findings, it would still enjoy substantial leeway to decide the legal 
relevance of those facts. 
 
 
 275.  See id.; Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life?, 94 TEX. L. 
REV. 59, 83–86 (2015) [hereinafter, Larsen, Shelf Life]; Larsen, Amicus Facts, supra note 12, 
at 1778; Larsen, supra note 10, at 1280–85. 
 276.  See generally FED. R. EVID. 201(a); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems 
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942); Faigman, 
supra note 21, at 162. 
 277.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
 278.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stipulating scope of review for court reviewing 
agency actions). 
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F. The Institutional Explanation: Mistrust of Congress and the Allure 
of Judicial Supremacy 
A final explanation is that the Court sometimes distrusts 
Congress and, hence, its facts. Sometimes this distrust is justified. 
Though Congress has substantial resources to gather and sort 
information,279 it does not always make use of those institutional 
advantages.280 Sometimes, instead, Congress makes “factual” findings 
without studying a problem closely.281 In such cases, Congress’s 
“facts” may actually be naked partisan statements devoid of 
empirical support.282 
The Court, indeed, may suspect sometimes that Congress has 
made ostensibly empirical findings in bad faith. For example, 
Congress sometimes points to evidence that conveniently—and 
suspiciously—fits the legal test for constitutionally controversial 
legislation.283 If the legislature’s use of facts is cynical, then the Court 
may believe that its findings are neither impartial nor empirical but 
rather the political preferences of the majority dressed up 
as evidence.284 
Cognizant of these concerns, the Court may often be disinclined 
to accept the legal relevance of Congress’s findings.285 Indeed, 
Justices may think it easier to brush aside questionable evidence as a 
 
 279.  Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection, and the Problem with Plebiscites, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption 
of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1473 (2010) (noting Congress’s access to 
the Congressional Research Service that can help facilitate factual findings). 
 280.  See Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 501. 
 281.  See, e.g., Devins, supra note 13, at 1182. 
 282.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007) (noting that Congress 
found that partial birth abortions are never medically necessary despite medical testimony to 
the contrary); Araiza, supra note 13, at 919–20. 
 283.  See generally Araiza, supra note 13, at 913–19; Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age 
of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 492–93 (2012). 
 284.  The phenomenon is hardly limited to the cases explored here. See, e.g., Whole 
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016); Linda Greenhouse, The Courts 
Begin to Call Out Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
08/18/opinion/the-courts-begin-to-call-out-lawmakers.html?emc=eta1&_r=0 (noting that 
the Court has appeared more willing “to call out legislatures for what they are doing, not just 
what they say they are doing”). 
 285.  See Ross, supra note 13, at 2031–32 (“In entire categories of cases, the Court 
questions whether the state’s record can be believed as a complete and unbiased presentation 
of evidence related to the constitutionality of the law . . . .”). 
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matter of law than to question openly it as a matter of fact. 
Additionally, even when the Court does trust Congress’s facts, it 
bears no obligation to accept those facts’ constitutional relevance. 
The Court, protective of its own institutional mission, may well 
think that its prerogative to determine constitutional meaning would 
be substantially reduced were it required to accept both the veracity 
and the legal relevance of Congress’s facts. 
The Court’s mistrust of Congress may also arise from important 
differences between the legislative and judicial institutions. The 
Justices themselves have little actual political experience and almost 
no legislative experience. None of the Justices participating in these 
cases ever held elected office, and only Justice Breyer worked in 
Congress (as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee).286 
The Justices’ lack of familiarity with the inner workings of Congress 
might contribute to their lack of trust and sympathy for 
that institution. 
Perhaps even more fundamentally, the Court’s kind of work 
differs dramatically from Congress’s. Supreme Court Justices are 
usually top-notch lawyers—intelligent, meticulous, and analytical. 
Though some have crafted public personas, the Justices need not 
return home regularly to address their constituents. Most would 
likely agree that the Justices should not bring a political agenda to 
their work.287  
Congressional representatives, by contrast, must constantly speak 
to the public about their policy preferences. Whereas most judges 
value analytical precision, representatives often speak in sound bites 
and glib generalities. The Justices, then, may distrust Congress 
in  part because judges and politicians value very different 
professional qualities. 
From that perspective, the Justices may see legislatures (or other 
institutions) injecting their own normative biases into their factual 
findings. In such cases, Justices may think that they should not 
credit  such naked partisanship. These cases, then, may reflect the 
 
 286.  See Laura Krugman Ray, The Legacy of a Supreme Court Clerkship: Stephen Breyer 
and Arthur Goldberg, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 83, 109 (2010). 
 287.  See Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into 
Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 58 (2014) (“Some Supreme Court justices agree 
that law and politics must remain separate.”). 
1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2018  2:20 PM 
525 When Facts Don’t Matter 
 581 
Justices’  own self-confidence that they can sniff out bogus 
factual assertions.288 
Relatedly, these cases reflect the Justices’ comfort with their own 
supremacy over questions of constitutional law.289 If Congress could 
demonstrate the constitutionality of controversial legislation merely 
by pointing to facts ostensibly justifying the law, the Court’s power 
of judicial review would be substantially diminished. The Court’s 
penchant for rejecting congressional facts as irrelevant, then, speaks 
to its interest in retaining the primary authority to decide questions 
of constitutional law. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of congressional facts, though 
normatively troubling, is not inherently constitutionally illegitimate. 
After all, Article III vests the Supreme Court with “appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact.”290 Indeed, questions of law and 
fact can be hard to untangle. As Alexander Hamilton explained in 
Federalist 83, “Though the proper province of juries be to determine 
matters of fact, yet in most cases legal consequences are complicated 
with fact in such a matter as to render a separation impracticable.”291  
That said, the Court’s disregard for congressional findings and 
other facts has important implications. This part explores those 
implications for both constitutional doctrine and our separation of 
powers. It begins with an examination of the doctrinal questions the 
Court left unresolved. It then turns to broader institutional 
implications and the status of facts in our society more generally. 
A. Doctrinal Puzzles and the Relationship Between Law and Fact 
The Court’s approach to facts in these cases leaves open 
important doctrinal questions. The questions are themselves 
 
 288.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 671; Karlan, supra note 81, at 68 (noting 
that the Justices’ confidence that they can deliver constitutional “right answers” “may reinforce 
Justices’ sense of their superiority”). 
 289.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 290.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 291.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
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important, as they result in legal uncertainty in important areas of 
constitutional law. Collectively, however, they also help demonstrate 
that the Court’s approaches to congressional findings in these cases 
can inject even more uncertainty into already under-determinate 
areas of law.292 
More precisely, while these cases indicate that facts may matter 
less than we are used to thinking, the Court does not tell us when 
they do matter. Indeed, the Court’s approach was decidedly muddy, 
making it difficult to separate law from fact.293 As a result, it is hard 
to measure the precedential impact of the decisions themselves. A 
lower court in future cases likely enjoys substantial discretion to 
claim that the Court’s decision binds it or, alternatively, that the 
underlying facts can be distinguished. Of course, to scholars who 
posit that the distinction between law and fact is itself a legal 
fiction,294 this uncertainty is hardly news. Nevertheless, the Court’s 
treatment of law and fact in these cases further exacerbates 
these difficulties. 
1. Shelby County 
Shelby County’s dismissal of congressional facts raises puzzling 
doctrinal questions. The Court’s analysis conveniently skipped an 
important step. The Chief Justice contended that because the VRA 
places a great burden on the principle of equal state sovereignty and 
because voter discrimination is a smaller problem than it once was, 
the VRA’s constitutional burden is too high for the statute to stand. 
The Court, however, never considered facts that would shine light 
on whether the problem of voter discrimination today might warrant 
the VRA’s burden on state sovereignty, notwithstanding 
improvements over the past half century. Instead, the Court assumed 
 
 292.  See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and 
Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (2006) (“Few major 
constitutional debates are clear-cut propositions . . . .”). 
 293.  See Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2013); 
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) 
(explaining that law and fact “are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum 
of experience”). 
 294.  See Larsen, supra note 293, at 67–68 (discussing this scholarship). See generally 
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1769, 1770 (2003); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992). 
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that because “[t]hings have changed in the South,”295 the coverage 
formula’s disparate treatment of states was invalid. 
The Court’s leap to this conclusion left open serious questions 
about how future courts should evaluate legislation seeking to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. The Court, in particular, 
offered little guidance about what kinds of contemporary evidence 
might support similar remedial legislation. Indeed, the Court did not 
even articulate the legal test for reviewing the constitutionality of 
legislation protecting against voter discrimination. 
As a result, it is very difficult for future courts to know how to 
treat similar legislation with a different record. Would a new 
coverage formula deserve greater judicial respect? If so, why did the 
Court ignore evidence that preclearance continued to do important 
work? Does the principle of equal state sovereignty essentially ban all 
future attempts to protect against voter discrimination on the theory 
that only the Jim Crow South’s egregious discrimination justified 
such intrusions on federalism? Alternatively, would evidence 
suggesting that racial discrimination in voting had reduced minority 
turnout or diluted minority voting power in recent elections 
diminish the decision’s precedential value? And how should lower 
courts approach other statutes enforcing the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments?296 
The Court offers little guidance for considering such issues. Even 
when it asserted that states ought to be treated equally, the Court 
acknowledged that it would permit “‘departure from the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty [if there were] a showing 
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to 
the problem that it targets.’”297 From this perspective, one should 
think that different facts could justify a different outcome.298 That 
said, a similarly constituted Supreme Court would likely view a new 
coverage formula skeptically. In all events, these questions about how 
 
 295.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009)). 
 296.  Cf. Larsen, Shelf Life, supra note 275, at 60–61. 
 297.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 298.  Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 271–72 (1999). 
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to treat facts inevitably create further questions about the content of 
the law. 
2. Citizens United 
Citizens United’s conclusion that only quid pro quo corruption 
justifies restrictions on corporate independent expenditures for 
election-related speech seems plain enough. Even a more robust 
record of corruption (more broadly understood) cannot support the 
constitutionality of a law regulating independent expenditures by 
corporations’ general treasuries for election-related speech.299 To this 
extent, the law of campaign finance reform is straightforward, 
albeit controversial.  
Citizens United’s broader First Amendment implications, 
however, remain unclear. As the Court itself explained, restrictions 
on speech, especially political speech, typically trigger strict 
scrutiny.300 Under strict scrutiny, the government must establish that 
its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 
This is a hard test to meet, but it is not impossible.301 In a typical 
case, the government presents facts to try to establish the necessity of 
its policy. Courts must determine whether those facts justify 
upholding the law under the strict scrutiny standard. Oftentimes, the 
policy falls because a court determines that the government has not 
met its burden.302 Sometimes, though, as in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, the Court finds that the policy satisfies strict scrutiny.303 
 
 299.  See Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) 
(invalidating Montana campaign finance law despite robust findings about history of 
corruption in Montana ostensibly justifying law). 
 300.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that burden political 
speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the 
restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.’”(quoting FED v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007))).  
 301.  See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010). 
 302.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 855 (2006) (noting that speech 
restrictions survive strict scrutiny in 22% of total cases in federal courts). 
 303.  See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39. Admittedly, the Court upheld the 
law using “a light touch in examining the government’s justifications.” Aziz Z. Huq, 
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 
23 (2012). 
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Citizens United appeared to prejudge the issue without applying 
strict scrutiny at all.304 The Court, in other words, was uninterested 
in the amount of harm inflicted on our country by corporate rent-
seeking,305 notwithstanding the argument that some “threats of 
corruption are far more destructive to a democratic society than the 
odd bribe.”306 The Court did not so much respond to this argument 
as offer the unsupported rejoinder that independent expenditures 
“do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”307 
It similarly did not seem to care whether such harm could be 
prevented by other less speech-restrictive measures. Rather, the 
majority insisted that, as a matter of law, such evidence did not 
matter,308 because the record did not contain “direct examples of 
votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.”309 
Had the Court actually applied the strict scrutiny standard to the 
facts, it might have still struck down the law. It could have 
concluded, for instance, that the governmental interest did not have 
a compelling interest in preventing the corruption Congress had 
identified.310 Alternatively, and probably more likely, it could have 
 
 304.  See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 617 (2011) (arguing that by keeping the “evidentiary standard impossibly high and 
the definition of corruption extremely narrow,” the Court avoided confronting the difficult 
question of whether expenditure limits might in fact pass strict scrutiny). 
 305.  See 146 CONG. REC. 6950 (2000) (discussing political corruption); Teachout, 
supra note 87, at 297 (noting that Citizens United “suffers from a failure to describe real 
pressures [on politicians and their staffers], and the way those pressures directly interfere with 
representative government in devastating ways”). 
 306.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 449 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 307.  Id. at 357 (majority opinion). 
 308.  See id. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to 
quid pro quo corruption.”). 
 309. Id. at 360 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 560 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
 310.  Such a conclusion would have been in tension with some important First 
Amendment precedent. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205–06 & n.88 (2003) 
(sustaining “legislation aimed at the ‘corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations 
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas’” with the purposing of 
“[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and sustain[ing] the 
active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the 
government” (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))); 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978)); id. at 788 n.26 (“Congress 
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concluded that the policy was not sufficiently tailored for various 
reasons, including the ease with which campaign finance regulations 
are circumvented.311 But though it gestured toward these 
conclusions,312 the Court did not engage seriously with the facts 
underlying the strict scrutiny analysis.313  
The Court’s approach leaves open important questions for First 
Amendment doctrine. Are courts to conclude in future campaign 
finance cases—or even other free speech cases—that some 
restrictions do not trigger strict scrutiny but rather are categorically 
invalid? The Court’s approach implies a categorical approach that 
calls into serious question the constitutionality of congressional and 
state attempts to limit independent expenditures (absent findings of 
quid pro quo corruption).314 However, the Court still purports to 
apply strict scrutiny, which at least ostensibly invites some inquiry 
into the governmental interest.315 The result is doctrinal confusion. 
3. NFIB 
Similarly, NFIB’s Commerce Clause discussion also makes it 
difficult to disentangle legal determinations from factual ones. Five 
Justices put significant weight on the distinction between activity and 
inactivity.316 Might future Courts invalidate long-accepted exercises 
of congressional power on the theory that the regulated activity 
could be characterized as inactivity? For example, as Professor 
 
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in 
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”). 
 311.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign 
Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2011) (“[I]n a system like ours—where elections 
are privately funded, where reform is piecemeal, and where public finance is generally not a 
realistic option—money hasn’t been taken out of politics. Donors simply find new, less 
transparent ways to gain influence in the process.”); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 161, 
at 1708. 
 312.  See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 364. 
 313.  Cf. id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our 
lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take 
measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in 
local and national races.”). 
 314.  See Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, 
Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 910 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, 
Real Problem]. 
 315.  See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 340. 
 316.  See supra Section I.A.3. 
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Metzger asks, could the Court strike down a federal statute requiring 
that new cars have seatbelts that can secure a child’s car seat, on the 
theory that some purchasers would not use that feature and are, 
therefore, inactive?317 Assuming arguendo that the Chief Justice’s 
and joint dissenters’ Commerce Clause analyses are not solely dicta, 
this question is hard to answer without knowing whether those 
Justices’ characterization of the health care market was an 
idiosyncratic view of the facts in one case or a legal instruction to 
characterize policy issues so as to limit Congress’s power. 
More generally, it is unclear whether NFIB represents a serious 
limitation on Congress’s commerce authority, or whether it is an 
isolated decision that applies only to a very unusual statutory feature. 
The Chief Justice did admit that “it is now well established that 
Congress has broad authority under the [Commerce] Clause.”318 His 
interpretation in NFIB, though, seemed awfully stingy, denying 
Congress power to regulate the health care market, despite that 
market’s manifest impact on interstate commerce. It is unclear 
whether this analysis applies only to Congress’s anomalous decision 
to require the purchase of a product or, alternatively, whether it 
signals that the Court will approach future Commerce Clause cases 
with an eye toward limiting federal power. 
4. More general doctrinal implications 
The Court’s approaches in these cases also raise difficult 
questions about some foundations of our adversarial system. Basic 
rules of American litigation ensure that courts decide concrete cases 
so that they have the benefit of a full record of facts. Standing rules, 
for instance, require that litigants have an actual stake in the case.319 
Ripeness rules, similarly, seek to separate matters that are premature 
for review from those with injuries appropriate for federal court 
review.320 Though both doctrines advance multiple goals, they share 
the presumption that courts, including appellate courts, should 
 
 317. See Metzger, supra note 133, at 95. 
 318. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012). 
 319. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 320. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 124 (7th ed. 2016). 
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decide cases with more than “factually barebones records.”321 While 
these decisions do not directly call these doctrines into question, 
they do raise doubts about the preference for developed facts 
underlying some justiciability doctrines. Why prioritize developed 
facts when the Court sometimes just casts them aside? 
Relatedly, the Court on numerous occasions has signaled that 
facial adjudication is premature if sufficient facts are not available.322 
The Court’s approaches in these cases, however, suggest that it often 
doesn’t care about facts at all. For example, once the Court decided 
to treat Citizens United as a facial challenge, it could have remanded 
the case for findings about how BCRA operated in practice.323 The 
Court instead rushed to judgment, apparently uninterested in the 
law’s effects. Similarly, the Court in Shelby County appeared mostly 
uninterested in evidence of continued discrimination and 
preclearance’s role in preventing voter discrimination. The result is 
confusion about the criteria for determining whether a facial or as-
applied challenge is more appropriate.324 Admittedly, that confusion 
exists anyway,325 but the Court’s approach in these cases only 
deepens it. 
In fairness, it is virtually impossible for the Court to balance all 
the competing norms in play in constitutional litigation. Our 
Constitution is full of conflicting values,326 which makes doctrinal 
tensions nearly inevitable. Nevertheless, the Court’s disregard of 
facts in these cases heightens those tensions. 
 
 321.  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (quoting United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). 
 322.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008); 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 
U.S. 75, 89 (1947); Fallon, supra note 135, at 960–61. 
 323.  See supra Section I.B.2. 
 324.  See generally Fallon, supra note 135, at 917–20 (discussing the “general myopia 
and confusion with respect to facial challenges in the Supreme Court, perhaps most especially, 
but by no means exclusively, among the Justices themselves”). 
 325.  See id. at 917. 
 326.  See, e.g., Justice David H. Souter, Commencement Address at Harvard University 
(May 27, 2010), in HARV. GAZETTE, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05 
/text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/ (“Not even [the Constitution’s] most uncompromising 
and unconditional language can resolve every potential tension of one provision with 
another . . . .”). 
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B. Institutional Implications 
1. Congressional irrelevance 
The Court’s willingness to disregard congressional facts when 
striking down federal legislation makes it harder for Congress to 
address pressing national problems. To be sure, the Court plays only 
a small role in the larger problem of congressional paralysis. Extreme 
partisan strife and the usual vetogates that make legislation hard to 
pass even in saner times have made it increasingly difficult for 
Congress to enact statutes.327 But the Court exacerbates the problem 
when it develops creative theories to invalidate legislation, knowing 
full well that Congress is very unlikely to pass a revised version. 
For example, when the Court struck down the coverage formula 
in Shelby County, it knew that Congress would not have the 
wherewithal to enact a new one. The Court indicated that it was 
merely leaving the matter in Congress’s hands,328 but it knew that 
current political realities and the structural difficulties of passing 
legislation made it impossible for Congress to enact a new coverage 
formula in the foreseeable future. The effect, then, was the 
invalidation of the preclearance provision, notwithstanding the 
Court’s claims to be addressing only the coverage formula.329  
Similarly, after Citizens United the combination of politics and 
judicial doctrine made it highly unlikely that Congress could reenact 
meaningful campaign finance reform. Indeed, as Professor Gerken 
has pointed out, Citizens United’s most enduring legacy is that it 
substantially cut back on Congress’s power to regulate in the area of 
campaign finance.330 In this way, the Court’s approach limited 
Congress’s ability to deal with the nation’s ills. 
 
 327.  See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE 
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW 
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 3–106 (2012) (describing partisan strife and political dysfunction); 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 756, 
756 (2015) (discussing vetogates). 
 328.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“Congress may draft 
another formula based on current conditions.”). 
 329.  See id. (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.”). 
 330.  See Gerken, Real Problem, supra note 314, at 908–11 (noting that Citizens United 
“prevented Congress and the FEC from adopting sensible fixes going forward”); see also 
Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 89–100 
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2. Separation-of-powers concerns 
The Court’s aggressive rejection of congressional facts also raises 
related questions about the judiciary’s role in our system of 
separation of powers. When the Court brushes aside congressional 
facts, it can more easily rely on its own views of the world. Whereas 
the Court clearly enjoys the prerogative to say what the law is,331 it is 
far more controversial for the Court to assert that its instincts about 
the health care market, corruption in the political process, or racial 
discrimination in voting should supersede the other branches’ views 
on such topics.  
While the Court in these cases did not purport to enjoy superior 
expertise to Congress on these topics, it did decide the constitutional 
questions without careful evaluation of evidence documenting 
continued voter discrimination, rent-seeking in politics, or the free 
rider problem in our health care system.332 Each of these policy areas 
looks very different when the core problem is brushed aside, and the 
propriety of legislative action also looks different when Congress 
seems to be acting without a real problem to address. We are more 
likely to think Congress has overstepped its bounds when it does not 
appear to be trying to remedy serious societal mischief but rather is 
intruding on the liberty of people or institutions who are 
“doing nothing.”333 
It is not clear that judicial review should encompass the authority 
to ignore or recharacterize the mischief Congress tries to remedy. 
After all, the federal judiciary does not possess either the expertise or 
the constitutional authority to determine which problems require 
legislative attention.334 Moreover, the people elect members of 
 
(2013) (discussing the emergence of single-candidate Super PACs and the extraordinary 
amounts of coordination the law permits between Super PAC and political campaign). 
 331.  See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 332.  Cf. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 19 
(2016) (noting that the Court has arrogated to itself the power to second guess congressional 
policy decisions). 
 333.  Cf. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 334.  See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role 
Obligations of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1717, 1737–38 (2016) (comparing the role of elected representatives with that 
of appointed judges). 
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Congress to represent their normative views and address the nation’s 
problems.335 Judicial restraint, indeed, is premised significantly on the 
understanding that politically accountable representatives, rather 
than unelected judges, should guide policy decisions and the values 
inspiring them.336 
Of course, courts’ institutional limitations should not give license 
to Congress to falsify empirical facts or violate clear constitutional 
strictures. But the Constitutional “rules” Congress supposedly 
violated in these cases were hardly clear. To the contrary, the Court 
devised them in the instant cases.337 Even more to the point, in each 
case the Court was able to find the statutes constitutionally infirm 
only by brushing aside the very evidence that Congress thought 
justified the statute. 
For all its talk of judicial restraint,338 the Court often trusts its 
own view of the world more than anyone else’s. By deeming 
irrelevant facts that Congress found and that lawyers subsequently 
presented,339 the Court can more easily steer a case to its desired 
outcome. Indeed, in each of the cases examined here, it would have 
been harder for the Justices to reach their ultimate conclusion had 
they forced themselves to grapple honestly and thoroughly with facts 
they evaded.  
The judicial behavior examined here is part of a larger pattern of 
judicial aggrandizement. The Court, indeed, is increasingly inserting 
itself into political, policy, and cultural disputes, sometimes 
 
 335.  See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 519, 521 (2012) (stating that one meaning sometimes given to judicial self-restraint is 
constitutional restraint where respect for the elected branch comes from the notion that the 
elected branch handles policy better). 
 336.  See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 139–40 (2d ed.1986); 
Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1082–83 (2008). 
 337.  See supra notes 201–227 and accompanying text. 
 338.  Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–11 (1973) (“[U]nder our 
constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the 
validity of the Nation’s laws.”). 
 339.  See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 13–34, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 
U.S. 2 (2013) (No. 12–96), 2013 WL 315242 (citing congressional findings supporting the 
decision to reenact section 5 and that the statute’s burdens were justified by then current 
needs and were appropriately tailored geographically); Brief for Petitioners at 3–12, Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs. v. Florida, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (sub. nom. NFIB v. Sebelius) (No. 11-
398), 2012 WL 37168 (summarizing facts upon which Congress relied when it enacted ACA). 
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deemphasizing justiciability doctrines and other reasons to avoid 
ruling on the merits. As Professor Monaghan has pointed out, the 
Supreme Court in recent years appears to have shifted its 
institutional mission from dispute resolution to law declaration.340 
The Court has long vacillated between these different models, but 
recently it seems especially willing to reach out to decide 
controversial questions that it could avoid.341 The Court’s treatment 
of congressional facts, then, is part of a larger phenomenon in which 
the Court has moved more aggressively to shape its own agenda and 
announce the country’s core constitutional commitments.  
In short, the Court’s approach to facts raises serious separation-
of-powers concerns.342 This Court’s apparent distrust of the 
legislative branch is a remarkable, if unstated, assertion of judicial 
supremacy. Though the Court talks a good game about the virtues 
of deference to elected leaders,343 its approach to factual findings is 
symptomatic of a Court that believes it knows best.344 Given that 
constitutional law at its essence asks courts to determine “who 
decides,”345 it is noteworthy that the Court retains for itself the 
power to decide not only the content of the law but also 
fundamental facts about the world in which we all live.  
3. Judicial confidence and public opinion 
The Court’s treatment of Congress’s facts reflects Justices who 
are very confident in their own views.346 This confidence is perhaps 
surprising. Congress may or may not have struck the correct policy 
balance in these statutes, but it at least studied the issues and made 
determinations about the underlying problems.347 The Court, to be 
 
 340.  See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related 
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012). 
 341.  See id. at 669. 
 342.  See Karlan, supra note 81, at 64 (“Across a broad range of cases, the Court 
expressed a suspicion of the political process . . . .”). 
 343.  See Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 469. 
 344.  See SEGALL, supra note 228, at 126–27. 
 345.  See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS 162 (2001). 
 346.  See Jennifer Mason McAward, Foreword: The Confident Court, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
379, 384 (2014). 
 347.  See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting 
Rights Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. 
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sure, has superior expertise on questions of constitutional law, but 
this expertise does not obviously extend to judgments about the 
problems Congress seeks to remedy. Nevertheless, the Justices based 
their constitutional analyses in large part on a worldview uninformed 
by Congress’s expertise. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the Court’s confident rejection of 
congressional findings, the Justices themselves were deeply divided 
about the relevance of the underlying facts.348 Indeed, the 
congressional findings that five Justices found irrelevant in Shelby 
County, Citizens United, and NFIB were central to the other four 
Justices’ reasoning in each case. These deep divisions belie 
the  majority’s conviction that Congress’s facts should be 
casually discarded.349 
The majority Justices in these cases may have been convinced 
they were correct, but their approaches may also compromise the 
Court’s legitimacy. When the Court brushes aside important facts in 
the name of newfound doctrine, it heightens the chance that the 
public will understand its opinions to be political documents.350 This 
risk is likely highest when a significant portion of the country takes 
seriously the same facts the Court ignored. For example, the public 
reacted strongly against Citizens United, in part because many 
people did think corruption of the sort Congress identified was a 
serious problem.351 Some readers may also have been skeptical of 
 
REV. 385, 403 (2008) (“[T]he amount of evidence amassed by Congress also stands as 
evidence of the particularly deliberative approach during the 2006 reauthorization process. 
Congress considered more evidence and committed more resources to studying the problem 
of ongoing voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions than it had to any other issue in 
several years.”); Renata E. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between Access and Influence: Building a 
Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 213 (2014) (noting that 
when Congress considered BCRA, it reviewed, inter alia, committee testimony, multiple 
investigations by Congressional committees, large-scale studies by advocacy and academic 
organizations, and lengthy statements by members of Congress). 
 348.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 694–97; Gorod, supra note 10, at 53. 
 349.  Cf. Gorod, supra note 10, at 56 (arguing that judicial opinions rarely try to gather 
all relevant facts and instead depend on “guesswork, intuition, and general impressions”). 
 350.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 733–35. 
 351.  See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 111–12 (noting that 80% of Americans reportedly opposed Citizens United 
and 65% strongly opposed it); Sarah Knight, Five Years After Citizens United, Signs of a 
Backlash, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/five-years-after-
citizens-united-signs-backlash-303336 (discussing the fallout after Citizens United). 
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the  Court’s unsupported assertion that “[t]he appearance of 
influence  or  access  . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in 
our democracy.”352 
Some commentators today contend that the Supreme Court’s 
legitimacy is in serious trouble.353 According to recent polls, the 
Supreme Court’s approval rating in 2016 fell to 42% and has been 
below 50% since Citizens United.354 Some studies report that 82% of 
Americans believe that the Justices decide cases in part based on their 
personal views.355 To be sure, the Court has always been the subject 
of criticism, but some argue that “the institution and its members are 
being disparaged by a wider and more sophisticated audience than 
ever before.”356 Indeed, the Court’s ostensible impartiality is 
especially vulnerable to attack when the Justices ignore important 
facts or rely on contestable ones.357 
Of course, to the extent public approval for the Court has fallen, 
the Court’s approach to facts is only a part of that phenomenon. The 
country is sharply divided along partisan lines,358 and many 
Americans cheer or jeer judicial decisions because of their outcomes, 
 
 352.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
 353.  See Brian Christopher Jones, Disparaging the Supreme Court: Is SCOTUS in Serious 
Trouble?, 2015 WISC. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 63 (“[T]he Court has unquestionably brought this 
increased disparagement upon itself.”). 
 354.  See Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732 
/supreme-court.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2017); Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Supreme Court Job 
Approval Rating Ties Record Low, GALLUP NEWS (July 29, 2016), http://www.gallup.com
/poll/194057/supreme-court-job-approval-rating-ties-record-low.aspx. 
 355.  See Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S 
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 306, 308 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); B. Jessie Hill, 
Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the 
“Pragmatic Moment”, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (2013). 
 356.  See Jones, supra note 353, at 53. But see Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New 
Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 154 (2013) (arguing that public opinion 
polls have given the Justices more legitimacy). 
 357.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social 
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961–63, 1984–88 (2006) 
(criticizing courts’ reliance on facts in cases involving controversial social change); Kahan, 
supra note 252, at 34 (noting that when the Court has invoked empirical evidence in deeply 
contested constitutional cases “the genuineness of its reasoning has provoked accusations of 
bad faith, not only from within the Court but also from without”). 
 358.  See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 327; Toni M. Massaro & Robin 
Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective 
Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 422–27 (2012). 
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without reference to their reasoning.359 That said, when the Court 
turns a blind eye to seemingly crucial facts, it risks magnifying the 
losing side’s outrage.360 This reaction, in turn, might heighten the 
public’s sense that the Court is a political institution. 
This concern should not be overstated. In an era when some 
public officials, including the President of the United States, ignore 
facts entirely,361 the Court, by contrast, seems like a temple of 
enlightenment rationality. Yet when the Court is so quick to brush 
aside important legislative findings without seriously engaging with 
the evidence or arguments in favor of their relevance, it risks opening 
itself up to avoidable comparisons with obviously mendacious 
public actors.362 
C. The Demise of Facts 
Finally, the Court’s attitude in these cases also contributes to the 
broader decline of facts in our society. Politicians and some segments 
of the media frequently reject facts they deem inconvenient to their 
political ends. There has always been good-faith disagreement about 
which facts are empirically correct and which ones should matter, but 
in recent years, there has been an alarming tendency to label as 
“fake” any stories that might harm one’s political agenda.363 
In most regards, the judiciary has done a better job than the 
other branches of government at examining asserted facts critically 
and subjecting them to rigorous assessment. Courts, after all, have 
 
 359.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 729–30. 
 360.  See EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE: HARMS OF INDIFFERENCE IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 8 (2011). 
 361.  See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, Trump Won’t Back Down from His Voting Fraud Lie. 
Here Are the Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24 
/us/politics/unauthorized-immigrant-voting-trump-lie.html; Donald Lambro, Trump and the 
Facts, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26 
/donald-trump-and-the-facts/ (noting that President Trump’s administration “has redefined 
the word ‘facts’”). 
 362.  Cf. CALHOUN, supra note 360, at 108. 
 363.  See Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at 
Mainstream Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25 
/us/politics/fake-news-claims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html; Amber Phillips, ‘Fake 
News’? The Russia Investigation is Getting Very, Very Real, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/08/07/fake-news-the-russia-investiga
tion-is-getting-very-very-real/?utm_term=.56952464eab1. 
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rules governing their consideration of evidence and facts found by 
other institutions.364 For all its flaws, the judiciary, including the 
Supreme Court, is functioning far better these days than the other 
branches of government. 
That said, the Court’s approach to facts in these—and other365—
cases contributes, albeit modestly, to the broader problem. The 
Court’s willingness to brush aside facts that Congress, the dissenters, 
and many others thought crucial to understanding the challenged 
legislation is a small part of a broader societal instinct to turn a blind 
eye to facts that do not conform to one’s pre-determined world 
view.366 If Supreme Court Justices are so willing to say that seemingly 
crucial facts do not matter, they may inadvertently signal that it is 
rhetorically acceptable to disregard inconvenient evidence. The 
Court’s example may be especially important for law students, who 
learn about the conventions of legal argumentation in part from 
reading Supreme Court opinions. 
Also significantly, the Court rejected these facts’ relevance in the 
name of controversial ideological principles. To be sure, the Justices 
were correct that the judiciary ultimately must decide when statutes 
violate the Constitution. But the majorities brushed aside Congress’s 
facts in service of a deeply contested constitutional vision.367 To this 
extent, the majorities’ treatment of facts is symptomatic of a broader 
societal phenomenon in which ideology trumps facts. 
The Court’s apparent prioritization of constitutional ideology 
over factual detail means that the Justices sometimes decide 
constitutional questions in an intellectual vacuum. By brushing aside 
the policy implications of the statutes at issue, the majority Justices 
rendered each of these decisions more intellectually abstract. This is 
no coincidence. It is easier to conclude that a statute violates the 
Constitution if one focuses on the constitutional norms at issue and 
shortchanges the policy goals the statute seeks to further. 
Indeed, it is far from clear that the majorities’ ideological 
preferences could have prevailed had the Justices considered the facts 
 
 364.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 365.  See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); Berger, Gross Error, supra 
note 17. 
 366.  See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 252; supra Section II.C. 
 367.  See supra Section II.A. 
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it ignored.368 The Court disregarded the real-world effects of the 
statutes at issue, because consideration of those facts would have 
militated against the conclusions the Court wished to reach. To be 
sure, there were strong legal arguments in favor of the majorities’ 
outcomes in these cases. However, the majority opinions in each case 
were less persuasive because the Court failed to engage carefully with 
facts from the world around it.  
IV. POTENTIAL REFORMS 
The Court’s penchant for evading inconvenient facts may be 
problematic, but the question remains what to do about it. To the 
extent some Justices sometimes ignore congressional findings and 
exploit the muddy distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges to advance their own normative commitments, an 
academic rebuke alone will not solve the problem. A solution is all 
the more difficult to devise because the Justices’ approach to facts 
sometimes may be quite unconscious, as the Justices, like most 
people, instinctively gravitate toward evidence supporting their 
preferred conclusion and away from contrary evidence.369 To borrow 
an insight from Professors Posner and Vermeule, given that the 
problem explored here is a creation of the Justices, it is unrealistic to 
expect that they would voluntarily mend their ways.370 
That said, attention is the first step in encouraging changes to 
the legal culture underlying the problem. While no law review article 
will immediately prompt changed judicial behavior, a careful 
discussion of the ways in which the Justices could write better 
opinions can gradually help change legal norms. Lawyers litigating 
before the Court, for instance, can emphasize not only important 
facts but also the reasons why the Justices should not ignore those 
facts. Relatedly, law professors can encourage their students—
tomorrow’s lawyers and judges—to think about what sound judicial 
opinions should include. To that end, this Part discusses modest 
 
 368.  See supra notes 338–40 and accompanying text. 
 369.  See FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM 23 (Joseph Devey ed., 1902) (1620) 
(“The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down . . . forces 
everything else to add fresh support and confirmation.”); supra Section II.C. 
 370.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1743, 1744–45 (2013). 
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changes that could improve the Court’s opinion writing and its 
treatment of facts. 
A. The Content of the Court’s Determinations 
1. The legal relevance of facts 
When the Court considers the constitutionality of a federal 
statute, it should more carefully explain why it finds Congress’s facts 
relevant or not. Similarly, when the Court must choose between 
treating a constitutional challenge as facial or as-applied, the Court 
should not only carefully justify its selected approach but also explain 
the impact that approach has on the universe of relevant facts. These 
suggestions are so commonsensical as to be obvious, but the Court 
in the cases examined here did none of these things. 
The suggestions here do not infringe on the Court’s discretion 
to invalidate statutes it deems unconstitutional, but they do 
encourage the Court to acknowledge more fully the facts it sets 
aside. In particular, the Justices should admit when they are 
disposing of congressional evidence primarily on the basis of new or 
long-dormant constitutional doctrine. The Court, of course, enjoys 
the prerogative to craft new constitutional rules, and sometimes new 
doctrine is entirely appropriate.371 But when the Court casts aside 
reams of evidence in service of new doctrine, it should admit what 
it is doing. 
Indeed, the Court’s doctrinal bait-and-switch disrespects 
Congress, which gathered facts to support a statute under certain 
constitutional ground rules only to have the Court change course. 
This practice grants tremendous discretion to judges to invent 
doctrinal wrinkles that permit them to ignore the very problem 
Congress sought to address. If the Court can simultaneously 
announce new doctrinal tests and dismiss congressional facts for 
failing those new tests, it has virtually limitless power to rewrite both 
law and fact. 
 
 371.  See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
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The Justices themselves likely would not admit such authority.372 
Perhaps for that reason, the Court has been far from transparent 
when it brushes aside congressional facts. The Justices in these cases 
were quick to cordon off Congress’s findings as irrelevant, but they 
offered little admission that they were doing this and minimal 
explanation for why those findings didn’t matter. 
Similarly, the Justices failed to provide thorough explanations for 
its decision to treat these cases as facial challenges, especially given 
persuasive arguments that each case (especially Shelby County and 
Citizens United) should have been decided as-applied. Nor did the 
Court explain how those determinations affected the relevance of 
particular facts. For example, the history of voter discrimination in 
Alabama and Shelby County would have been central to the analysis 
had the Court treated the case as an as-applied challenge—and 
likely  would have cut against the Court’s holding.373 The Court 
should  not  make such important determinations without more 
careful discussion.  
Nor should the Court brush aside facts as legally irrelevant 
without offering some explanation of what kinds of facts would 
suffice. Shelby County leaves us to understand that evidence of 
second-generation barriers to voting is insufficient to justify the 
Voting Right Act’s preclearance coverage formula. Nowhere, 
however, does the Court clearly state what evidence Congress should 
offer instead.  
To the contrary, the Court substituted pithiness for sustained 
analysis. Confronted with the argument that section 5’s deterrent 
effects should justify the coverage formula, the Court complained 
that this approach would leave the law “effectively immune from 
scrutiny.”374 “[N]o matter how ‘clean’ the record of covered 
 
 372.  See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner Broad. II), 520 U.S. 180, 195 
(1997) (“We owe Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far better 
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon’ 
legislative questions.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC (Turner Broad. I), 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994) (plurality opinion))); United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (noting that legislative findings aid “informed 
judicial review, as do the reports of the legislative committees, by revealing the rationale of the 
legislation”); Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 472. 
 373.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
 374.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013). 
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jurisdictions,” the Court worried, “the argument could always be 
made that it was deterrence that accounted for the good 
behavior.”375 The Court’s attempted legal jujitsu may be clever, but it 
fails to grapple with facts before Congress indicating that many 
covered jurisdictions’ records would not have been “clean” but for 
section 5.  
Rather than looking for a reason to ignore Congress’s findings, a 
better approach would confront the strongest arguments that 
Congress’s facts do in fact justify the law at issue. In some cases, the 
Court might still conclude that the statute is unconstitutional. In all 
cases, though, the Justices at least would have seriously engaged with 
the evidence and arguments Congress considered most important. 
2. The characterization of facts 
The characterization of facts is closely related to their relevance. 
Once again, the Court owes a more careful explanation of its 
determinations. NFIB’s Commerce Clause analysis, in particular, 
turned substantially on how the Court perceived the object of 
Congress’s regulation. As we have seen, whereas the Chief Justice 
and joint dissenters characterized the statute as regulating “inaction” 
(i.e., people forced to buy something they otherwise wouldn’t), 
Justice Ginsburg treated the same behavior as “action” (i.e., the 
decision to pass one’s health care costs onto the rest of society). 
These characterizations mattered a great deal, but because the 
Chief Justice simply asserted his preferred characterization, he never 
clarified the nature of his constitutional objection. Did the Chief 
Justice believe that it was unconstitutional to require an unwilling 
person to buy health insurance, even with evidence demonstrating 
that that same uninsured person will go to the doctor tomorrow and 
not pay his bill? Alternatively, did he believe that the existence of 
uninsured non-free riders renders the entire mandate facially 
unconstitutional, even as applied to free riders? A defense of the 
preferred characterization would have shed much needed light on 
these questions. 
 
 375.  Id. 
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Thus, just as the Court could better explain the relevance or 
irrelevance of particular facts, so too could it better justify its choice 
of one characterization over another. After all, the Chief Justice in 
this case selected a characterization that allowed him to ignore 
findings linking the free rider problem to interstate commerce. In 
fact, the Court sometimes does not even acknowledge that its 
version of the “facts” is, really, a preference for one characterization 
over another. 
To be sure, Justices will always be able to steer an opinion where 
they want it to go. That said, if Justices were in the habit of engaging 
thoroughly with inconvenient facts, they may be a little more self-
aware of the extent to which their own characterizations are value 
laden. While it may be impossible to remove Justices’ norms from 
these kinds of determinations,376 the Justices could do a better job 
recognizing their underlying values by acknowledging their 
characterizations in the first place. 
3. The context of institutional analysis 
The Court could also explain more carefully its reasons for 
trusting or distrusting Congress in each case. Of course, the veracity 
and relevance of facts are analytically distinct, and the Court 
sometimes dismisses Congress’s facts as legally extraneous without 
indicating that it disbelieves them. That said, the Court may be more 
inclined to discard certain facts if it distrusts the methods Congress 
used to gather the facts. After all, if a Justice does distrust 
congressional facts, it may be easier for judges to brush inconvenient 
facts aside as a matter of law than to try to demonstrate they are 
empirically incorrect.  
However, the Court ultimately treats congressional facts, it could 
offer more careful institutional analysis. While the Court 
theoretically could decide to grant or deny deference in all cases 
involving congressional facts,377 there are serious dangers of a one-
 
 376.  See, e.g., SEGALL, supra note 228, at 59–60; William N. Eskridge & Philip P. 
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 351–
52 (1990). 
 377.  See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-
Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 46–55 (2009) (arguing that blind deference is not appropriate and 
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size-fits-all approach. Institutional behavior and factual contexts can 
differ tremendously from case to case, and a theory of deference that 
might make sense in one case might be less desirable or even absurd 
if mechanically applied elsewhere.378 
Indeed, depending on the context, Congress may or may not be 
deserving of deference.379 On the one hand, Congress, unlike courts, 
enjoys the resources to gather information from numerous sources. 
It can hold hearings and call witnesses to bolster its factual 
understanding of important questions.380 When Congress makes 
decisions based on its careful use of these institutional advantages, 
there are good reasons to think that its facts deserve deference. 
Congress, however, sometimes makes decisions based on 
ideological preferences rather than empirical realities.381 It sometimes 
acts at the behest of special interest groups, and, when it does, 
committees sometimes send staffers to assemble boilerplate factual 
findings without doing real research.382 Congressional committees 
likewise can select witnesses to justify pet projects rather than to 
gather a complete, unbiased account of the facts.383 Whether 
Congress’s facts are to be trusted in a particular case, then, 
depends  not on abstractions about its inherent institutional 
 
suggesting a theory to apply instead); cf. Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and 
Constitutional Interpretations, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014). 
 378.  See Araiza, supra note 13, at 906–30 (proposing inquiries to guide the deference 
determination); Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 498–500. 
 379.  See Devins, supra note 13, at 1207. 
 380.  See, e.g., Charlow, supra note 279, at 578–79; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress 
in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 209–11 (1971); Daniel A. Farber 
& Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 448 (1988). 
 381.  See Borgmann, supra note 377, at 8; Devins, supra note 13, at 1183; William H. 
Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political 
Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 398–401 (1988). 
 382.  See, e.g., Devins, supra note 13, at 1208; Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister: 
Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-
Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 367–68 (1984). 
 383.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1017 
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that congressional findings had been driven by policy goals 
rather than medical or scientific evidence); KOMESAR, supra note 345, at 141; Devins, supra 
note 13, at 1197 (“Congress finds facts when there is a reason to do so.”). 
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properties  but  whether the legislature made serious use of its fact-
finding capacities.384 
The Court, however, often does not explain why it trusts or 
distrusts Congress’s facts and their relevance in a given case. Of 
course, sometimes it may be difficult to glean Congress’s fact-finding 
processes from the available materials, but the Court often does not 
even bother to look.385 It also often does not even discuss how 
Congress made use of the facts it found or whether Congress 
included those facts in the statute itself. 
To be sure, the Court sometimes gestures toward Congress’s 
epistemological strengths or weaknesses, but broad platitudes about 
Congress’s broad institutional characteristics are not a substitute for 
careful, contextual institutional analysis.386 Rather than relying on 
generalizations about Congress’s institutional strengths, the Court 
should engage in careful institutional analysis discussing whether 
Congress’s factual findings are likely to be trustworthy given the 
particular context. Similarly, it should compare Congress’s relevant 
institutional characteristics with its own.387 
The Court in some cases may suspect Congress of biased fact 
finding, but because the Justices do not engage carefully in these 
analyses, it is sometimes difficult to know what they are thinking. In 
Shelby County, for instance, the Court did not make clear if it 
distrusted evidence indicating that preclearance continued to do 
important work in many covered jurisdictions. Were Congress’s 
factual findings less rigorous than usual? Did the record suggest that 
Congress had already determined the “facts” it wanted before it 
began gathering evidence? Did the Court want more evidence that 
preclearance continued to protect against voter discrimination or 
that the coverage formula could not have been effectively redrawn? 
The Court never said. 
 
 384.  See Araiza, supra note 13, at 906–22 (proposing inquiries to guide the deference 
determination); Devins, supra note 13, at 1170. 
 385.  Perhaps some Justices do look but do not include their findings in their 
written opinions. 
 386.  See Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 501–05. 
 387.  See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 197 (1994) (arguing that 
institutional analysis must necessarily be comparative). 
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The Court should also examine whether facts enacted into the 
statute itself deserve special weight. While there are reasons to think 
courts should care about Congress’s sense of the problem in all 
events, one would think that textualists in particular would want to 
engage with factual findings enacted into a statute, like the ACA. 
The Justices in NFIB, however, offered no such discussion.  
The Court should also discuss whether Congress enjoys 
particular epistemic authority over the subject matter at issue. 
Congress presumably will know more than courts about most 
matters of policy, but arguably it is especially knowledgeable about 
certain topics. For example, in the areas of voting rights and 
campaign finance reform, Congress dealt with topics about which 
senators and representatives have greater experience than most 
judges.388 The Court, however, did not even discuss whether 
Congress’s findings over such topics merited special respect 
or attention. 
The point here is not that the Court should necessarily view the 
political branches’ factual findings charitably.389 Indeed, where facts 
truly are legally irrelevant, Congress’s processes and expertise should 
not matter. However, the Court sometimes blurs together the legal 
relevance and trustworthiness of congressional findings. Closer 
attention to these institutional questions would certainly improve the 
Justices’ assessment of the facts themselves. It may also help them 
with the legal analysis. After all, constitutional doctrine routinely 
requires judges to engage with the facts against which the 






 388.  See Bob Bauer, What to Do About the Court: Two Views, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD 
L. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/10/what-to-do-about-
the-court-two-views/ (arguing that politicians who are convinced that money accounts of 
certain legislative behavior are the “acknowledged experts” on questions of campaign 
finance policy). 
 389.  See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 13, at 910–22 (examining instances in which Congress’s 
factual findings merit less deference). 
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B. The Tone of the Court’s Determinations 
1. Aporetic engagement  
The problem with the Court’s treatment of facts in these cases is 
a matter not just of content, but also of tone. To this extent, the 
problem is partially one of judicial craft: the Justices are too willing 
to steer around inconvenient evidence as they write their opinions.390 
Phrased somewhat differently, the Justices’ rejection of congressional 
facts in these cases is part of a larger phenomenon in which they 
write opinions to emphasize their strongest points and conceal 
their weakest.391 
The Court’s quick dismissal of Congress’s facts speaks to a 
broader penchant for refusing to take seriously arguments on the 
other side of the litigation ledger.392 As I have argued elsewhere, the 
Court often writes its opinions to make hard cases sound much 
easier than they in fact are.393 That phenomenon helps explain the 
problem here. If the Justices were more committed to conceding the 
difficulty of the case at hand, they would be less inclined to brush 
aside inconvenient facts. To this extent, a change in tone could also 
yield a change in the facts with which the Court carefully engages. 
As Professor Kahan has argued, the Court could cultivate a more 
aporetic rhetoric.394 “Aporia,” as he explains it, refers to a mode of 
argumentative engagement that acknowledges, rather than dismisses, 
complexity and competing evidence.395 A Justice writing an opinion 
in the aporetic mode can still render a binding decision in a case but 
should acknowledge the other side’s strong arguments and facts.396 
More aporetic engagement would require the Court to discuss 
carefully Congress’s policy goals and the factual landscape that 
prompted legislative action in the first place. Similarly, this approach 
would encourage the Court to examine closely how the decision 
about whether to treat a challenge as facial or as-applied impacts the 
 
 390.  See supra Section II.D. 
 391.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 729. 
 392.  See id. at 751–52. 
 393.  See id. at 671–79. 
 394.  See Kahan, supra note 252, at 62. 
 395.  See id. at 62–63. 
 396.  See id. 
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universe of relevant facts. If Congress has, in fact, exceeded its 
constitutional authority or violated an individual right, the Court 
should invalidate the relevant statutory provision. The Court, 
however, should not do so without honest consideration of the 
problems Congress tried to address. 
Of course, a statute’s constitutionality does not rest solely on 
Congress’s belief it is addressing a grave societal mischief. That said, 
the Court owes it to Congress to take seriously its worldview. More 
aporetic engagement would encourage the Court to discuss 
Congress’s findings carefully before deciding whether they were 
legally irrelevant. While such engagement realistically may not 
change the Justices’ minds often, it could force them to think more 
consciously about the assumptions underlying their decision-making, 
including their instincts about facts.397 
To this extent, a more aporetic rhetoric could operate as a 
modest but important speed bump. The Justices’ enjoy vast 
discretion in their exercise of judicial review, and ultimately it is up to 
them to police the exercise of that discretion themselves.398 But if the 
Justices were to attempt a more aporetic rhetoric, they would be 
more likely to force themselves to engage with inconvenient facts 
and to justify more carefully their decision to treat a constitutional 
challenge as facial or as-applied. We could not realistically 
expect  a  sea change in judicial practices, but we could expect 
some improvement. 
2. Candor 
Just as the Court could more honestly acknowledge strong 
arguments on the other side, so too could it more candidly explain 
the norms underlying the Justices’ decisions. A common thread 
running through these decisions is that the five conservative Justices, 
over the dissents of the four liberals, struck down parts of federal 
legislation with minimal regard for what Congress was trying to do 
and why. To be sure, the majority had plausible legal arguments on 
 
 397.  See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 754. 
 398.  Cf. Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1495 (2017) (discussing lawmakers’ incentives to acquiesce to 
judicial decisions). 
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its side. In each case, however, there were also strong arguments for 
why Congress’s factual findings should have mattered a great deal. 
The Court’s rejection of Congress’s worldview ultimately had 
less to do with the clear doctrinal requirements and more with 
underlying normative principles.399 As we have seen, constitutional 
first principles in these cases trumped Congress’s policy-based facts. 
Contrary to the majority’s insistence, the Constitution did not 
require the outcome in any of these cases. Rather, the outcomes 
were constitutionally plausible, and the majority of Justices’ 
normative preferences guided their decision-making. 
It may be inevitable for norms to guide these kinds of 
decisions.400 Most judges cannot easily separate their own normative 
views from their judicial decisions, especially in constitutional cases 
where there are few clear rules limiting judges’ discretion.401 That 
said, judges could try to do a better job recognizing and 
admitting  the ways in which norms shape their own decision-
making processes.402 
The opinions in these cases are written as though norms played 
no role in the decision to jettison congressional findings. While it 
may be difficult to adopt new practices, the Justices should 
encourage themselves and each other to explain more candidly the 
true reasons for their decisions.403 Some Justices may believe that the 
underlying norms are baked into our constitutional structure, but 
their opinions would be stronger if they admitted that their preferred 
constitutional principles are contestable. As Professor Powell puts it, 
only if we “understand the true grounds of a decision can we assent 
to its correctness or . . . to its validity as the outcome of our system 
even though we think it wrong in substance.”404 
 
 399.  See supra Section II.A. 
 400.  See supra notes 251–65 and accompanying text. 
 401.  See POSNER, supra note 249, at 272 (“The Court is awash in an ocean 
of discretion.”). 
 402.  See id. at 289 (encouraging Justices to acknowledge “to themselves 
the  essentially  personal, subjective, political, and . . . arbitrary character of most of their 
constitutional decisions”). 
 403.  See, e.g., Crane, supra note 120, at 673. 
 404.  H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 90 (2008). 
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Judicial candor also can be a way of encouraging the Justices 
themselves to become more aware of their own implicit biases.405 
Indeed, part of the problem in these cases is that the majority 
Justices confidently assumed that they were correct and failed to 
question the premises underlying their decisions.406 To this extent, 
more transparency and candor might produce greater introspection 
among some Justices. It is not clear that the Justices are themselves 
aware of the extent to which their own factual assumptions and 
underlying normative biases drive their legal or factual analyses, or 
the extent to which this phenomenon may undermine their 
credibility. Increased transparency might help the Justices more 
readily identify their own biases. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s penchant for ignoring seemingly vital facts in 
constitutional cases speaks to its considerable power to direct and 
alter the shape of constitutional law. Shelby County, NFIB, and 
Citizens United were each significant decisions with important 
practical and legal implications. While the Justices’ opinions in each 
case were fairly convincing on their own terms, they seem woefully 
lacking in light of the facts the Justices refused to discuss. 
This disregard of facts confuses constitutional doctrine, 
aggrandizes the judiciary, disrespects Congress, and contributes to 
the demise of facts in our society. To be sure, it is ultimately up to 
the judiciary to determine which facts have constitutional salience. 
But in these cases, the Court did not explain adequately why it 
brushed aside these facts. Before deeming irrelevant facts that 
prompted legislative action, the Court owes us all a more 
careful explanation. 
These issues get to the heart of the uneasy line between law and 
politics in constitutional law. It is impossible for the Court to 
separate politics from constitutional law completely. It is also nearly 
impossible to always draw a clear distinction between law and fact, or 
between facial and as-applied challenges. Greater attention to these 
 
 405.  See Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 389–90 (2012). 
 406.  See McAward, supra note 346, at 380. 
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issues, however, would yield more careful, candid, thorough, and 
convincing constitutional opinions. 
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